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31 October 1979

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1472



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# USSR REPORT

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COMMENTS ON USTINOV BOOK

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 3-8

[Unattributed lead article "Marking the Publication of Comrade D. F. Ustinov's book 'Selected Speeches and Articles': "On Guard for Socialism, Peace, and the Security of Peoples"]

[Text] Efforts aimed at completing the tasks of communist construction, fighting for a secure peace, and insuring protection of socialism's historic achievements are merged into one in the multifaceted activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These great, vitally important problems make up the content of the recently published book by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov.\*

It contains selected speeches and articles covering his activities at executive party and government posts from 1942 to February 1979.

The works brought together in this book deeply examine the pressing problems of the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party and Soviet government in a long period of our society's life, and they demonstrate the great creative labor contributed by the Soviet people to implementation of the most important political, socioeconomic, and ideological indoctrination measures of the party. The book devotes special place to problems having to do with protecting the socialist fatherland, strengthening our country's defense capabilities, raising the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and consolidating the fighting union of the fraternal armies of the socialist countries. The book clearly demonstrates the monolithic unity of the party and people, and the ever-increasing role of the CPSU--the inspiration and organizer of all of the Soviet Union's victories.

All of the successes of our people and their victories over the numerous enemies are associated with the party's tremendous organizational, political,

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\* Ustinov, D. F., "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 519 pp.

and ideological-theoretical activity. In Lenin's way, wisely and sagaciously, it is pointing out Soviet society's course of development, in Lenin's way it is competently putting the incalculable possibilities of socialism into action, and in Lenin's way it is realistically determining the current tasks and persistently fighting for their successful completion. In all of its domestic and foreign policy, the CPSU unwaveringly follows Lenin's commandments (page 6).

Demonstrating the growing influence of the Communist Party in the conditions of mature socialism, the author devotes much room to revealing the titanic activity of the Leninist CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo, and he emphasizes the outstanding significance of the contribution made by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to developing Marxist-Leninist theory, and to developing and implementing party policy aimed at strengthening the USSR's economic and defensive power, peace, and international security.

In its activities, the CPSU invariably and consistently guides itself by Marxism-Leninism--the most progressive revolutionary doctrine of modern times. It is firmly pursuing the main goal of its economic policy--to raise the material and cultural standard of living of the laborers to the fullest. "Leninist principles of economic development--national economic planning, democratic centralism, a combination of one-man command and effective participation of laborers in management, the organic unity of material and moral stimuli of labor, economic accountability, and mass competition--have become mighty levers for development of the socialist economy" (page 8). In this book the reader will find a deep party approach to analyzing the problems of national economic development and to the struggle for raising the effectiveness and quality of social production, and he will find many interesting data, figures, examples, and facts confirming how much has been done in the country in response to decisions of the 23d, 24th, and 25th CPSU congresses pertaining to public welfare and development of economics, culture, and socialist democracy.

The struggle for a peace which would insure the most favorable external conditions for socialist and communist development is the most important area of activity of the party and its Central Committee. "Peace for the people!" This was Lenin's appeal made at the very dawn of Soviet rule (p 30). Since that time the USSR has been consistently and untiringly fighting for a just peace, for the security of peoples. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have achieved tremendous successes along this road. The Soviet Union and the fraternal countries of socialism are now concentrating their efforts at conclusively eliminating the threat of nuclear war, at attaining positive changes in international relations, at deepening and strengthening relaxation of tension, and at making this process irreversible. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev is making a great personal contribution to this. This was brilliantly confirmed by the results of his recent meeting with U.S. President J. Carter, which ended with the

signing of a treaty between the USSR and the USA limiting strategic offensive arms.

Socialism and peace are indivisible. The Soviet people are decisively defending the peace in a time in which the countries of capital exist and the forces of reaction, aggression, and war are actively opposing relaxation and disarmament and promoting restoration of the "cold war" policy, expansion of existing aggressive blocs aimed against the USSR and the entire socialist community, and creation of new aggressive blocs. Irrefutable evidence of this can be found in the swift growth of outlays made by countries of the aggressive NATO bloc on military preparations, which attained astronomical proportions from January 1968 to February 1978--\$1.3 trillion. Characteristically, "almost half of these colossal assets were spent in the last 4 years" (page 31). American hawks and their yes-men, meanwhile, are shouting about a so-called "Soviet military threat." The book decisively reveals the slanderous nature of this false legend. "The Soviet people have never and will never brandish their weapons," D. F. Ustinov notes. "This would be alien to our policy, and it would be contrary to our convictions and principles. The Communist Party and the Soviet government are fighting untiringly for a peace based on a sound foundation of international security and cooperation" (page 32).

Considering that the most aggressive and reactionary imperialist circles have become active and that the present Chinese leadership has now taken a stand with them, the CPSU believes its sacred duty to be to raise the alertness of the Soviet people, strengthen the country's defense capabilities, and raise the combat readiness of the armed forces. This side of the Communist party's activity is given a worthy place in the book. It deeply and thoroughly analyzes the principal traits and basic directions of the CPSU's military policy, the activities of commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy, the unique features of military development at the time of mature socialism, and the typical traits of the armed forces of the all-peoples state.

Strengthening the country's defenses, the Communist Party guides itself strictly by Lenin's teaching on protecting the socialist fatherland, and by V. I. Lenin's definition of party leadership as the foundation of Soviet military development. Lenin's sagacious ideas have enjoyed creative development in the CPSU program, in decisions of the party congresses, in decrees of the CPSU Central Committee plenums, in the USSR Constitution, and in works by L. I. Brezhnev and other party leaders. The author speaks warmly and penetratingly about L. I. Brezhnev's works "Malaya zemlya" (The Little Land), "Vozrozhdeniye" (Resurrection), and "Tselina" (The Virgin Land) as a treasurehouse of experience in war and labor, as a source of inspiration and creativity for the Soviet people and for army and navy soldiers.

D. F. Ustinov's speeches and articles clearly reveal the heroic road traveled by the Soviet Armed Forces from the moment of their creation to

the present day, in which they have become the armed organization of an all-peoples state. They cause memories of the menacing events of the Civil War to surface, and they honorably reflect the unfading heroism of the armed forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Touching upon the results of the glorious road traveled by the Soviet Armed Forces, D. F. Ustinov notes: "The principal result is that the correctness of Lenin's premise concerning the tremendous role of the armed forces in protection of the socialist fatherland has been persuasively confirmed by the entire course of social development and by history itself. This result expresses itself, furthermore, in the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces, which are inseparably united with the people and led by the party, have always been and continue to be a faithful guard over the achievements of October. It is also seen as the fact that the Communist Party's policy in military development has brilliantly withstood the test of time" (pages 34-35).

During the struggle against fascist invaders and Japanese militarists the Communist Party was truly a warring party, and its Central Committee was the war headquarters, exercising supreme political and strategic leadership over the country and the armed forces. More than half of the party's members were in the operational army. By the end of the war one out of every four Soviet soldiers was a party member or candidate. The fact that 3 million communists died the death of the brave during the war, to be replaced by 5 million more, speaks for itself and requires no commentary.

Great was the role of communists in mobilizing the laboring masses of the rear, which supplied everything necessary for life and combat activities to the front in an every-increasing scale. The author views this side of the party's organizational activity through the prism of the close unity of the army and people, and the front and rear. The book pictures the Soviet people well as the true heroes of the war, and their party as the inspiration and organizer of the defeat of the fascist invaders. These qualities are revealed on the basis of real people--soldiers and troop commanders, scientists and designers, common laborers, and defense industry executives. The military and labor deeds of these people are alloyed with the grandiose events of the war. Pages demonstrating the role of the rear in insuring the war's success, and the significance of defense industry, which completed complex, important tasks in those years, will elicit true pride in Soviet readers. The arms-makers, the book states figuratively, had to wage an offensive together with the Red Army, fulfilling and surpassing its requests (page 50). As we know, D. F. Ustinov made a major contribution to supplying weapons to the front as USSR Peoples Commissar of Armament in the past war.

We can see from these materials that the outcome of the struggle for the liberty and independence of our motherland was decided both on the battlefields and in plant and factory shops, in kolkhozes and sovkhoses, in the mines, and on the highways.

One fact that is well put in the book is that the continuing growth of the role of party management of the armed forces even in times of mature socialism is natural. The reason for this lies in a large number of mutually related factors, the most important ones of which are: the complexity of processes occurring in the world arena, and the unprecedentedly greater responsibility the party holds for correctly analyzing the military-political situation and taking timely, effective steps against aggression, no matter where its origin; growth in the dependence of the fighting power and combat readiness of the armed forces on the country's socioeconomic and cultural level, and its moral-political and spiritual potential; expansion of the international tasks of protecting socialist achievements. The party takes full account of the action of these factors in its work, and it competently and purposefully utilizes the advantages and possibilities offered by mature socialism for strengthening the country's defense capabilities.

"There are two things that have always been and will continue to be...the object of my main concerns," said L. I. Brezhnev. "They are broad for the people and the security of the country."\* These words, the book emphasizes, also clearly express the main concern of our party for preserving and strengthening peace while raising the country's alertness and strengthening its defensive power. However, "our power is not turned and never will be turned against other nations. It is a menacing deterrent to all who covet something that is not theirs, those who fight against the interests of our country and the interests of the entire socialist fraternity. Inasmuch as adventurers have not changed their ways, peace on earth depends on the combat readiness and battleworthiness of our armed forces."\*\*

The most important obligation of the USSR Armed Forces and their sacred duty to the people is to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor. The need for maintaining the troops and the naval forces at such a state of readiness stems from the experience of history, from the present international situation.

Combat readiness, the author emphasizes, is made up of many components, the main ones being the manning level and equipment availability of the army and navy, their readiness to execute complex and diverse missions, the combat coordination of military collectives, the moral-political and combat qualities of the personnel, the organizational capabilities of commanders, staff, and political workers, and their ability to maintain firm, continuous control over the troops in all combat situations.

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\* PRAVDA, 20 December 1978.

\*\* "Statement by L. I. Brezhnev on Awarding the Order of Lenin and the Hero of the Soviet Union 'Gold Star' Medal to D. F. Ustinov" (PRAVDA, 2 November 1978).



New weapons have a dominant influence on the combat readiness of the armed forces. This means that soldiers must have a deep knowledge of modern weapons and combat equipment, they must be able to handle it proficiently, and they must know how to "capitalize to the maximum on the combat capabilities the armament possesses, strike the enemy at great distances with the first shot or launch, and make full use of the speed, altitude, maneuvering, defensive, and other qualities of the weapons and combat equipment. This can rightfully be called the number one task" (page 395).

Military labor is now becoming even more complex and intense; its intellectual level has risen immeasurably, which imposes greater requirements on the moral-political qualities, psychological steadfastness, and physical endurance of the personnel. "Soldiers are made, not born," notes D. P. Ustinov. "And the higher the quality of training and indoctrination and the closer the conditions of exercises, flights, and sea cruises are to real combat conditions, the faster the soldier develops" (page 38).

Officers, to the training and indoctrination of which the CPSU devotes a great deal of attention, play a decisive role in the struggle to raise the combat readiness of the units and ships, and to achieve effectiveness and quality in training and indoctrination. Their selfless devotion to communism and to their socialist motherland, their high ideological-theoretical preparedness and professional proficiency, their strict observance of Lenin's style in their work, and their ability to perform their principal duties in close unity with training and indoctrination of all personnel of the army and navy are a guarantee of the inviolability of our fatherland's borders. Socialist competition is highly significant to completion of these tasks; its forms change, the book points out, but its essence, as expressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, remains constant: "Work better today than yesterday and better tomorrow than today.... And better means placing the emphasis on quality, on effectiveness...."

The author believes the scientific grounds for raising combat readiness can be built by improving troop moral-political training and intensifying party-political work--a unique sort of weapon that never becomes obsolete. Party-political work encompasses all spheres of the personnel's activities and life, it actively influences the conscience and hearts of Soviet soldiers, and it mobilizes them to successfully complete their missions. Fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination," commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy are striving for further intensification of the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, service within which is a remarkable school of labor and military skill, of moral purity and bravery, of patriotism and

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\* PRAVDA, 18 December 1977.

comradship. Everything is being done to see that soldiers would deeply recognize their duty of protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the peace and socialism. Party organizations and their assistants in battle--the army Komsomol--are the firm cementing force of the military collectives. Communists and Komsomol members are a tremendous force and a dependable support to commanders striving to raise combat readiness.

Solving the problems of building and improving the army and navy, the CPSU relies upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine and on the premises and conclusions of Soviet military science, development of which would be unimaginable without considering the invaluable experience acquired by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. "This," the book points out, "is an important factor in education of Soviet soldiers, one of the sources of further development of the art of war. The party teaches us...to persistently and purposefully study the war experience, to interpret deep processes and the most important laws and trends of development in military affairs in a new way, and to reveal the fundamental factors responsible for the nature, course, and outcome of battles and operations in the past years. It is only on the basis of a thorough analysis of the mutual relationship between events of the past and present that we can establish dialectical continuity in military affairs, and on this basis creatively improve the latter, raising them to a qualitatively new level" (page 389).

The country's defense capabilities are growing stronger in inseparable unity with fundamental sociopolitical transformations. The military policy of the CPSU is based on the dialectical unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political, and military potentials, the fundamental components of the country's defensive power. The characteristic traits of the Soviet Armed Forces enjoyed further development in the stage of mature socialism, and they have become enriched by a new content. Of tremendous interest in this regard are the book's profound and multifaceted characterizations of the USSR Armed Forces as the armed forces of an all-peoples state.

The entire countenance of the Soviet Armed Forces, the minister of defense points out, reflects the humanitarian essence of the society of mature socialism, and the nobility of its goals. The armed forces are a mighty implement of defense of the interests of all the people, insuring the security of the socialist fatherland (page 35).

The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are a living embodiment of socialist internationalism. They perform their duty of protecting revolutionary achievements in combat cooperation with armies of other Warsaw Pact countries. It is emphasized in this case that the Soviet people and the soldiers of the army and navy have done and will continue to do everything necessary to strengthen the fraternal defensive union--the Warsaw Pact, and to develop and multiply the glorious traditions of combat cooperation (page 393).



"It is a high honor to belong to the Soviet Armed Forces," notes Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. "Great is the trust of the party and people, who have placed powerful weapons in the hands of the soldiers. This trust places a tremendous responsibility upon all of us in the military who are doing our job--being constantly on guard, watchfully protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the achievements of Great October, and tirelessly serving the great watch on the ground, in the air, and on the expanses of the seas and oceans" (page 399). These words express the thoughts and dreams of all Soviet people and of soldiers in their glorious armed forces.

The book by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov is a fabulous work about the Leninist party, the Soviet people, the valorous armed forces, their historic achievements, and the labor and military deeds of the Soviet people. It is a tremendous contribution to development of the urgent problems of war and peace, and to the theory and practice of military development and of the training and indoctrination of personnel in the Soviet Army and the USSR Navy.

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## PREPARATIONS FOR THE BERLIN OPERATION IN WW II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 9-16

[Article, published under the heading: "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Lt Col N. M. Ramanichev, instructor in the Frunze Military Academy: "From the Experience of the Regrouping Armies During Preparation for the Berlin Operation"]

[Text]The preparation for and conduct of operations in the past war involved different forms of troop combat activities, to include regrouping. The latter entailed changing the existing disposition of the troops in the theater of war (on the particular strategic or operational axis) or in the zone of advance (defense) by moving major formations, formations, and units from some areas into others such as to create a new grouping or reinforce an existing grouping. Troops were moved for these purposes on foot, by rail, by water and air transportation, or by a combined means.

In all cases the principal requirement imposed on troop regrouping was prompt arrival of the troops in their designated area, fully ready to engage in combat; the satisfaction of this requirement was insured by meticulous planning, by competent organization of the movements, by the high training level of the troops, by swift and covert movement, comprehensive support to the latter, dependable air cover, and continuous and firm command and control of men and equipment. The Great Patriotic War is rich in experience of conducting tactical, operational, and strategic troop regroupings. This experience has important significance today.

The Editor's Office and the Editorial Board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL are beginning an integrated discussion of the experience of organizing and performing troop regroupings in the Great Patriotic War and in the


postwar period. It would be desirable to use concrete examples to reveal the best forms and methods of work (actions) by staffs (troops), and to demonstrate improvements promoting further development of modern art of war. The discussion begins with the article, published below, by Lieutenant Colonel N. M. Ramanichev, an instructor at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

The operations of the Great Patriotic War, and especially the Berlin operation, provided highly rich and instructive experience in regrouping troops over great distances within a short time. Troops were regrouped during the preparations for the Berlin operation in order to create strategic and frontal groupings; the regrouping basically entailed movements of combined-arms and tank armies in their full complement to new axes, utilizing different forms of transportation and methods of movement. Twenty-eight armies participated in this regrouping; of these, 15 (see Diagram) were moved up to 365 km away from the zones or regions they had occupied previously, while three (the 3d, 28th and 31st) were moved from 530 to 800 km.

Time was extremely short. While from 22 to 48 days were allocated (from the moment a Supreme Headquarters directive was received) to organize the Belorussian, Eastern Prussian and Vistula-Oder operations, 15 days (from 1 to 15 April 1945) were allocated to preparations for the Berlin operation by the 1st Belorussian Front (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov) and the 1st Ukrainian Front (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev), and 19 days (from 1 to 19 April) were allocated to the 2d Belorussian Front (commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy).

Under these conditions the problem of finding ways to reduce preparation and regrouping time acquired great significance. The task was tackled by all levels of authority, beginning with the Supreme High Command General Headquarters. The latter determined the number of armies that had to be included in each of the front's strike groupings, and the deadlines for interfrontal regroupings. The General Staff established, for major formations and formations placed into the Headquarters reserve and transferred to the fronts, the schedule and means of movement, the routes, the rail lines, the loading and unloading regions, the number of trains, and other data. A high degree of centralization made it possible to plan the deadlines of army movements in the most effective way, and to make sensible use of lines of communication and transportation resources, which was especially important considering the large quantities of troops committed to the operation and the limited number of travel routes.

Basing itself on the experience of preparing for the Berlin operation, this article examines the ways employed to reduce the time for organizing and performing the regrouping; it also examines factors which had an influence on the effectiveness of its concealment, and some problems of troop command and control.



Army Regrouping (April 1945)

Key:

- |                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| 1. Baltic Sea             | 13. Danzig                               |
| 2. Szczecin               | 14. Konigsberg                           |
| 3. Berlin                 | 15. 3d Belorussian Front                 |
| 4. Frankfurt              | 16. Warsaw                               |
| 5. Neisse                 | 17. Scale                                |
| 6. Breslau                | 18. Legend                               |
| 7. 1st Ukrainian Front    | 19. Front lines of demarcation           |
| 8. Jarocin                | 20. Before regrouping                    |
| 9. Poznan                 | 21. After regrouping                     |
| 10. 1st Belorussian Front | 22. Position of armies before regrouping |
| 11. Schneidemuhl          | 23. Direction of army regrouping         |
| 12. 2d Belorussian Front  | 24. Enemy position                       |

The time required to implement the basic measures of organizing the regrouping in the armies and fronts was reduced by promptly orienting the generals and officers of the field directorates, and by issuing preliminary instructions

before planning at troop level was completed. This order insured that the staffs of major formations and formations would work in parallel. As an example without waiting for his staff to formalize his decision, Colonel General V. S. Popov, commander of the 70th Army, personally related the mission to his corps commanders on 7 April.<sup>1</sup> The staff of this combined formation's LXVII Corps planned the movement of the formations, and its commander signed the combat order at 0400 hours on 8 April.<sup>2</sup> The combat instructions of the army headquarters, which confirmed the oral directives issued by the commander, with insignificant elaborations, arrived 5 hours later. Thus this order of presenting the missions made it possible to complete the planning at army headquarters and at corps headquarters almost simultaneously.

The time required to plan the regrouping was also reduced by decreasing the number of documents written. This was done by integrating them--that is, by combining them. In a number of cases the documents were not written completely due to shortage of time or the lack of the need for reflecting particular issues in them.

Faster and better-organized army regrouping was promoted by prompt removal of some of the troops from the assault echelon, as a rule on instructions from the front commander in the concluding phase of the preceding operation. This made it possible to allocate more time to preparing the main army forces for travel, and to reduce the time before the zone occupied prior to the regrouping was officially transferred to other formations. As an example as a result of moving the main forces of the 3d Strike Army and the 47th Army (commanders, Colonel General V. I. Kuznetsov, and Major General F. I. Perkhovich) out of the assault echelon of the main forces, there were respectively only two and one rifle divisions left in the assault echelons still occupying those zones. Thus only one night was required for the changeover.

In order to accelerate regrouping, capitalizing on weak enemy activity on certain axes the command began advancing the main army forces on a new axis, leaving insignificant covering forces in the previous zone until the arrival of replacements.

The order of regrouping of the Polish 1st Army (commander, Lieutenant General S. G. Poplavskiy) was as follows. On receiving instructions to regroup on the night of 8 April, formations and units defending on the Pomeranian coast were removed from the assault echelon, and in the following night, 2 days before the arrival of replacements, they began moving on their new axis. An infantry division and a cavalry brigade were left to defend the coast.

One of the ways for reducing regrouping time was to sensibly select the methods of troop movement. A comparison of the rates of movement enjoyed by different armies would show that the greatest impact is achieved when rifle troops are moved not only by motor transportation (special wheeled

vehicles traveled on their own power), but also by railroad, the latter handling the tracked equipment (see Table).

# Principal Regrouping Data for Several Armies

(1) Армия	(2) Расстояние, км	(3) Способ перегруппировки	(4) Время выезда, сут	(5) Средняя темп движения, км/сут
28	700-800	(6) Главные силы -- железнодорожным транспортом, колесные машины -- своим ходом	17	41-47
31	600-775	(7) То же	16	37-48
3	500-600	"	13	40-46
49*	300-350	(8) Главные силы -- автотранспортом, гусеничные машины -- железнодорожным	5	58-73
65*	280-300	(7) То же	5	56-60
4 гв тан (10)	220	(9) своим ходом	5	50
2 уа (11)	270-280	(7) То же	6	41-53
5 гв (12)	120-150	"	5	24-30
1 АДП (13)	120-150	"	5	25-30
2 АДП (14)	120-150	"	5	24-30

\* Movement of the rifle troops of these armies required three trips by motor transportation. The main forces of the 65th Army marched on foot during their first day of movement.

## Key:

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|--|--|
| 1. Army  | 7. As above  |
| 2. Distance, km  | 8. Main forces--by motor transportation; tracked vehicles--by rail |
| 3. Method of regrouping  | 9. On their own power  |
| 4. Time of movement, days  | 10. 4th Guards Tank Army   |
| 5. Average rate of movement, km/day  | 11. 2d Strike Army   |
| 6. Main forces--by rail transportation; wheeled vehicles--on their own power | 12. 5th Guards Army  |
|  | 13. Polish 1st Army  |
|  | 14. Polish 2d Army   |

Due to late arrival of rolling stock and its poor preparation, as well as due to incomplete restoration of station tracks and other causes, the rates at which Colonel-General A. V. Gorbatov's 3d Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinskiy's 28th Army, and Lieutenant General P. G. Shafranov's 31st Army of the 3d Belorussian Front (placed in the Headquarters Reserve) were loaded was from one to four trains slower than planned. On



the other hand armies of the 2d Belorussian Front were loaded basically according to plan owing to high centralization of shipment planning and control. The front's military council established rigid control over the use of rolling stock, and in view of its scarcity it took steps to reduce its turnover time. The frontal staff periodically sent officers out to inspect the work of rail terminals. Thus they always maintained an impression of the availability of rolling stock, the nature of freight at the stations, and the condition of track, loading platforms, and station structures. This made it possible to objectively estimate the situation and take prompt steps to eliminate the causes of traffic delays. Unloaded trains were assigned escort officers who were to insure their prompt return to their regions of departure. Because there were not enough four-axled flatcars to carry medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, "shuttle trains" were formed, which following unloading were returned immediately to the loading regions.<sup>3</sup>

The distance from troop dispositions to the loading stations and to the final concentration areas--the unloading stations--had a significant influence on total regrouping time. Thus troops of the 28th Army had to cover about 100 km after unloading, which required 3 days, while the 3d Army was 10-30 km from its unloading area, and the troops were able to travel this distance in just a single day.

The time required to carry personnel by motor transportation was decreased basically by performing forced marches. According to the Field Service Regulations of that time the normal day's march of mechanized columns was 150 km. Owing to movements by forced march the 200th Rifle Division, 49th Army (commander, Colonel I. I. Mel'der) managed to travel 358 km in 25 hours.<sup>4</sup> In this case travel itself took 17 hours, and 8 hours were allocated for major halts.

When troops had to be moved on foot for distances equivalent to 3 and more day's marches, the subunits were moved one at a time by animal-drawn and motor transportation. Captured transportation was employed extensively for these purposes. Moving in this way, the 2d Strike Army (commander, Lieutenant General I. I. Pedyuninskiy) traveled 320 km in 6 days, as opposed to the planned 8 days. The average day's march was 41-53 km, as opposed to a norm of 30 km.<sup>5</sup>

Regrouping time was also reduced by decreasing the depth of the march formation of armies and formations, which was achieved by decreasing the spacing between moving columns and providing a larger number of travel routes. We should note, however, that despite presence of a rather dense paved road network most armies advanced on two to three travel routes. This is explained mainly by the need for moving large quantities of troops in the short time allocated to preparations for the operation, and by slow restoration of the roads. In particular, at the beginning of the regrouping there was one destroyed bridge for every 8 km of roads in the zone of advance of armies of the 2d Belorussian Front.

The great scope of the regrouping imposed staff requirements on its covertness, for which purpose the troops utilized all forms of camouflage and the experience they had accumulated by the end of the war. Staff summaries of the army groups and documents belonging to the main command of the German ground troops make no mention of the regrouping of the 2d Strike Army, 3d, 24th, and 31st armies. Even on 19 April (on the 4th day of the operation) the fascist command believed that the headquarters of the 2d Strike Army, which reached (Gul'tarni) (24 km east of the Oder) as early as on 11 April, was in the vicinity of Danzig (that is, in its former position), and it was unaware of the positions of the 3d, 24th, and 31st armies.<sup>7</sup> Note that by this time the main forces of these combined formations were already concentrated within the zones of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Besides strict compliance with camouflage and deception measures, the principal factors making it possible to conceal the regrouping were, in my opinion, as follows: absence of contact with the enemy at the moment occupied zones were transferred to replacements, concentration of the main army forces in the rear areas after the regrouping just prior to the beginning of the operation involving it, and maintenance of the former position of some units of forces (those in contact with the enemy).<sup>8</sup>

But enemy reconnaissance did manage to reveal the regrouping of some of the armies. By as early as 6 April--that is, on the second day of the advance of the 4th Guards Tank Army (commander, Lieutenant General D. D. Lelyusheiko), the daily report of Army Group Center mentioned intense movement of motorized columns from the vicinity of Brieg (Brzeg) to an area northwest of Liegnitz (Legnica), and it raised the hypothesis that this army was on the move.<sup>9</sup> On the same day the command of the enemy ground troops received information that the 49th and 70th armies of the 2d Belorussian Front were advancing to the River Oder, that they were possibly replacing the Polish 1st Army and the 61st Army (commander, Colonel General P. A. Belov) on this line, and that the latter were to be used on the axis of the main strike of the 1st Belorussian Front.<sup>10</sup> That the enemy was able to get this information was explained mainly by violation of measures aimed at covert troop control and by negligence of camouflage measures on the part of a number of commanders, staffs, and troops--that is, by low camouflage discipline.

Thus despite orders to march only during the night, troops of the 4th Guards Tank Army continued to travel during the day. As an example the main forces of two brigades in Colonel V. I. Koretskiy's V<sup>th</sup> Guards Mechanized Corps continued to travel until 1200 and 1500 hours on 6 April, while all other units continued to march throughout the entire day.<sup>11</sup>

Movement of the 2d Belorussian Front's armies to concentration areas following their replacement and movement during daylight were among the principal reasons of the enemy's swift detection of their withdrawal to the rear and advance on the Szczecin axis. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that in the period from 5 to 7 April the enemy command rested its estimates of the position and nature of actions of the front's armies



on information obtained from aerial reconnaissance in six cases out of 10. At the same time its estimate of the situation within the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the armies of which basically moved at night, made references to aerial reconnaissance data only once during this period.

Violation of command directives prohibiting the use of communication resources to discuss the regrouping and transmission of uncoded information made it possible for enemy agents to obtain a number of important pieces of information. On 7 April one of them reported overhearing instructions stating that "the forward detachment of one of the divisions of the Polish 1st Army was to take along enough fuel for 450 km."<sup>12</sup> Overheard by a fascist agent, a conversation in which the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the 2d Belorussian Front participated was the source of information on regrouping of Colonel General of Tank Troops M. Ye. Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army and Major General I. G. Dremov's VIII Guards Mechanized Corps on the River Oder line.<sup>13</sup>

Without a doubt the strategic situation and the position of the troops of the 2d Belorussian Front at the end of March helped to uncover the regrouping of its armies. By this time the liquidation of enemy troops on the coast of the Gulf of Danzig within the zones of 49th, 65th, and 70th armies was coming to an end, and it was clear to the fascist command that these armies would be participating in the final strike against its Berlin grouping.

The great travel distances and simultaneous utilization of different methods of travel by many armies imposed complex tasks upon command and control elements.

Operational groups played a major role in maintaining continuous control over army troops. These groups supervised the loading of troops on rail transportation, kept charge over them in the new area until the command post arrived, reconnoitered the new zone to be occupied, and coordinated with the staffs of troops being replaced on organizing transfer of the zone. Operational groups were also appointed to manage troops surmounting important natural lines. Such a group was created, in particular, in the 3d Army to manage troops crossing the Vistula. Swift crossing of the troops was insured by the authority given to the army chief of staff heading the group. The problem in this case was that a shortage of crossing points threatened failure of the army's planned movement. An additional crossing was organized in the vicinity of Graudenz (Grudziadz) by order of the chief of staff, and a number of steps were taken to insure prompt arrival of troops in the new area.<sup>14</sup>

As a rule an operational group supervising troop loading operations was headed by a deputy commander, and a group intended to control troops in a new area was headed by the staff's chief of operations. Experience showed that when the operations chief was not given sufficient authority, important regrouping problems could not be solved well. As an example

artillery belonging to the 28th Army arrived in an area near Jarocin designated by General Headquarters on 6 April. The army staff operations group, which carried a combat order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front placing the army within the composition of that front, arrived in that area on the same day. This order indicated the final area of concentration and the travel routes to be taken by the troops. Absence of sufficient authority on the part of the operations chief who was heading the group meant that the artillery did not begin to advance to its final area until 8 April, when the army commander arrived at Jarocin and issued the appropriate instructions to the troops.<sup>15</sup>

Communication was maintained in the course of the regrouping by mobile resources as a rule. However, wire communication was also employed by the provost service, and for communication between the army staffs and frontal headquarters.

To monitor the actions of the troops, commanders at all levels and the army commander personally inspected, by motor vehicle (airplane), the travel routes, the rest and concentration areas, and the loading and unloading areas. Army, corps, division, and service staffs also organized special mobile control posts which monitored the principal troop movements in the most difficult sections of the route and carried reports from formations in their rest areas to the command post or to the operations group. Individual officers were often sent out in airplanes or motor vehicles for monitoring purposes. Moreover signal officers and pilots were also given the responsibility of monitoring compliance with concealment measures and with the order of movement by the troops.

One of the most important problems of troop command and control was that of organizing the provost service, which insured efficient, smooth movement of troops and which provided the headquarters with the information it needed on the course of the regrouping. One of the main problems facing it was that of regulating the traffic with limited manpower. Experience showed that the best ways for completing this mission were successive traffic regulation and use of mobile traffic control posts and route signposts. Successive traffic regulation entailed simultaneous organization of traffic control posts along a distance of the route equivalent to 1 or 2 days' march, and then "leapfrogging" them after each day's march was completed. Thus in the 65th Army (commander, Colonel General P. I. Batov), companies of the 23d Separate Road Maintenance Battalion were assigned to each of the rifle corps. The commanders of the XLVI and CV rifle corps, lieutenant generals K. M. Erastov and D. F. Alekseyev, organized successive traffic control by setting up enough posts to support 1 day's march. Lieutenant General N. Ye. Chuvakov, commander of XVIII Corps, apportioned the company subordinated to him among the rifle divisions, the commanders of which organized traffic regulation by mobile control posts, moving them as the divisions passed each of the posts.<sup>16</sup> This method insured dependable traffic regulation on four routes having a total length of more than 1,000 km. In view of the fact that the 49th and 30th armies organized traffic regulation by setting up permanent posts along their entire route of

advance, each of these armies used two road maintenance battalions for these purposes to handle travel routes totaling a little more than 700 km. Thus the successive method and traffic regulation by mobile control posts resulted in more than a twofold savings of men and equipment.

The army regrouping performed in preparation of the Berlin operation demonstrated that each army could not use more than three travel routes, though according to the regulations an army was to advance on eight and more travel routes.

The greater potentials of the technical reconnaissance resources of probable enemies may make it extremely difficult to camouflage troop movements. At the same time the war experience shows that the effectiveness of the camouflage measures employed depends significantly upon the accuracy with which all commanders, staffs, and troops comply with the planned measures, and on maintenance of firm discipline and high alertness. Purposeful, effective party-political work has the most important role in this regard.

Analysis of the experience examined in this article leads to the conclusion that the operational groups created by the staffs of major formations should have been given more authority, and the right to issue orders to the troops. The groups needed this authority because of the frequent and dramatic changes in the situation and in the means and directions of travel, caused by greater enemy influences upon lines of communication.

The possibilities the enemy has today for interdicting lines of communication have grown immeasurably; therefore the number of operable stations and rail lines may turn out to be extremely limited, going as far as to preclude troop movement. In this connection it would be fully possible to combine movement of wheeled equipment on its own power and shipment of tracked vehicles by rail when great distances must be traveled.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Sbornik voyenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" (Collection of Military-Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War), Issue 7, Voenizdat, 1952, p 110.
2. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], f. 427, op. 1110, d. 315, l. 46.
3. TsAMO, f. 237, op. 2394, d. 1305, l. 153. A shuttle train was a train of constant composition, consisting of 25 four-axled flatcars and five cars for train personnel.
4. TsAMO, f. 404, op. 9711, d. 577, l. 12.
5. TsAMO, f. 309, op. 4073, d. 845, ll. 39, 50.

6. Ibid., f. 237, op. 2394, d. 1216, l. 112.
7. Ibid., f. 500, op. 12484, d. 1303 (captured map showing the position of Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front).
8. At the moment they transferred the zones they were occupying, the 3d, 28th, and 31st armies were defending the coastline of the Bay of (Frish-Gaf). The first of these armies concentrated within the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front on 16 April--the day of the beginning of the operation; the 28th and 31st armies finished their concentration on 20 April. One rifle corps was left in the former zone of the 2d Strike Army.
9. TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12451, d. 122, l. 134.
10. TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12451, d. 122, ll. 88-89, 193.
11. Ibid., f. 6 gv. mk, op 204147, d. 10, l. 95.
12. Ibid., f. 500, op. 12451, d. 122, l. 197.
13. Ibid., l. 193.
14. TsAMO, f. 310, op. 4376, d. 460, l. 268.
15. Ibid., f. 382, op. 8465, d. 183, l. 244.
16. TsAMO, f. 422, op. 220918, d. 2, l. 250.

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## EMPLOYMENT OF AVIATION IN MANCHURIAN OPERATION DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by senior scientific staff member, Candidate of Technical Sciences Engr-Col G. Bryukhovskiy: "Features of Employing Aviation in the Manchurian Operation"]

[Text] The principal component of the Far East Military Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1945 was the Manchurian strategic operation, which was conducted from 9 August to 2 September by the forces of three fronts--Transbaykal, 1st Far Eastern, and 2d Far Eastern in interaction with the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Troops of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Army also participated in this operation. The Transbaykal Front contained the 12th Air Army (commander, Marshal of Aviation S. A. Khudyakov), the 1st Far Eastern Front contained the 9th Air Army (commander, Colonel General of Aviation I. M. Sokolov), and the 2d Far Eastern Front contained the 10th Air Army (commander, Colonel General of Aviation P. P. Zhigarev).<sup>1</sup> The actions of the air armies were planned and coordinated by Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov, the Soviet Army Air Force commander and General Headquarters air liaison officer. He was supported by an air force staff operational group (staffed by personnel from the field headquarters of the Soviet Army Air Force).<sup>2</sup>

The air armies of the Transbaykal and 1st Far Eastern fronts, which played the main role in the operation, were reinforced by formations and units that had gained combat experience in defeat of the air forces of Hitler's Germany. Two bomber corps (each consisting of two divisions), a fighter division, a Guards bomber division, and an airlift division were redeployed to the Far East.<sup>3</sup>

Soviet aviation was superior to Japanese aviation in quantitative respects (Table 1).

The overall ratio of forces in aviation was 2.5:1 in favor of the Soviet Army Air Force. Our side also enjoyed qualitative superiority. YaK-3, YaK-9, YaK-7b, and LA-7 fighters and PE-2, YU-2, and IL-4 bombers were

significantly superior to the Japanese I-97 and I-90 fighters and the SB-96 SB-97 bombers in relation to combat properties. The Japanese Air Force did not possess any ground attack aircraft. The Soviet Air Force, meanwhile, possessed the unexcelled IL-2 and IL-10. Many of our pilots and regimental, division, and corps commanders had considerable combat experience.

The missions of the air force were as follows: attain air supremacy and cover frontal troop groupings, support ground troops breaking through fortified regions; strike rail facilities and trains, and prevent maneuver of enemy operational reserves during the offensive; disturb troop command and control; perform aerial reconnaissance and provide reconnaissance information to the staff of combined arms (tank) major formations and formations.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1. Quantitative Ratio of Air Forces of the Sides in the Manchurian Operation as of 8 August 1945.\*

(1) Type of aircraft	Number of aircraft of the USSR				(7) Bomber	(8) Fighter	(9) Reconnaissance and other aircraft
	12th Air Army (3)	10th Air Army (4)	9th Air Army (5)	Pacific Fleet Air Force (6)			
(10) Bomber	416	172	278	187	1021	400	1.7:1
(11) Ground attack	139	—	168	146	809	—	Absolute superiority (16)
(12) Fighter	549	638	528	395	2111	1200	1.8:1
(13) Reconnaissance	27	13	95	207	174	150	2.5:1
(14) Airlift	210	24	13	—	247	—	Absolute superiority (16)
(15) Mine and torpedo	—	—	—	170	170	—	To us (17)
(7) Total	1361	1217	1072	1356	5045	2000	2.5:1

\* The table was compiled on the basis of data from TsAMO, f. 5782, op. 226012, d. 1; f. 360, op. 515227, d. 1; f. 349, op. 142201, d. 2.

Key:

- |                                 |                          |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Aviation arm                 | 10. Bomber               |
| 2. USSR Air Force               | 11. Ground attack        |
| 3. 12th Air Army                | 12. Fighter              |
| 4. 10th Air Army                | 13. Reconnaissance       |
| 5. 9th Air Army                 | 14. Airlift              |
| 6. Pacific Fleet Air Force      | 15. Mine and torpedo     |
| 7. Total                        | 16. Absolute superiority |
| 8. Japanese Air Force           | 17. As above             |
| 9. Quantitative ratio of forces |                          |



The combat activities of the 12th Air Army were planned for the first 5 days of the front's operation, those of the 10th Air Army were planned for only the first day of the operation, and the combat activities of the 9th Air Army were planned for 18 days (5-7 days for the preparatory phase, 1 day for destruction of defensive structures, and 9-11 days for penetration of enemy defenses and exploitation of the breakthrough).

The 9th Air Army required detailed planning because of the presence of fortified regions, which may have hindered deployment of the front's main strike forces on the selected operational axes at the beginning of the offensive.<sup>5</sup> To achieve surprise, the actions of this army's aviation in the first two phases of the operation were rescinded on the eve of the operation by a directive from the front commander. The units and formations of the air army were to take to the air at dawn on 9 August.<sup>6</sup>

Working jointly with the staffs of tank and combined arms armies, the air army staff thoroughly prepared interaction plans, standardized coded maps, radio signals, and code tables, and mutual identification signals.<sup>7</sup> Interaction between the air force and ground troops in the Manchurian operation entailed coordination of the efforts of the air armies with the principal strike groupings of the fronts with the goal of achieving the greatest results.

The defeat of fascist Germany showed that interaction between air armies and frontal troops must basically be organized according to the support principle, which made centralized control and massed use of aviation possible. The organization of the air force's interaction with the ground troops was predetermined in many ways by the unique basing conditions and combat activities of aviation in the specific conditions of the Far Eastern theater of war. Enlargement of the composition of the air force and its regrouping and concentration at the eve of the operation necessitated preparation and expansion of the airfield network.

Logistical and airfield engineering support to the combat activities of the air force was made complex owing to the limited number of lines of communication available, especially in the course of the offensive. The vastness of the theater, the desert-steppe and mountainous forested terrain, absence of population centers and water sources, and the harsh climatic conditions all taken together made the work of the air force rear difficult. A shortage of men and equipment in the aviation base areas also had an effect. This is precisely why the Supreme High Command General Headquarters reinforced the air armies with air force maintenance units and formations. Ammunition, food, water, and POL were delivered centrally by order of aviation base area chiefs. Reserves of everything necessary were created to support combat activities for 12-13 days of the operation.

Torrential rains, fog, lightning, a low cloud ceiling, presence of deserts and mountainous forests, and a limited number of reference points

hindered air activity. This is why navigational analysis of the regions of air combat activities had important significance. A system of control and identification markers set up on the summits of hills 3-6 km from the border and 50-60 km apart was created to support navigation and interaction of the efforts of aviation and the ground troops. The most important roads were marked by special signs. Ground navigation support resources were moved to forward airfields by the beginning of the operation. Direction finders and homing radio stations were situated near the fighter bases, radio beacons were set up at bomber bases, and light beacons were located at IL-4 night bomber bases, along their flight routes, at the principal airfields, at monitoring and identification posts, and at checkpoints. Leader pilots from units permanently deployed in the Far East were assigned to regiments arriving from the west. The study of the base areas and the regions of combat activities was organized in the squadrons, units, and formations; maps of various scales were employed, and flights over the terrain in transport airplanes were provided. Air formations permanently deployed in the Far East made preparations for over 3 months. Formations arriving from the western theater of war had 15 to 30 days to prepare. The measures of the preparatory period indicated here insured successful completion of the air force's missions.

Air reconnaissance was performed not only by reconnaissance regiments and squadrons but also by up to 25-30 percent of all bomber, fighter, and ground attack forces. Ground attack aircraft and fighters had to perform tactical reconnaissance to a depth of 150 km and keep the battlefields under observation; reconnaissance units and bombers performed operational reconnaissance to a depth of 350-450 km, and strategic bombers performed strategic reconnaissance to a depth of 600-700 km.

In the month prior to the operation enemy territory was photographed to a depth of 30 km. This made it possible to reveal the enemy defense system, to conclusively plan the breakthrough sectors, to select river crossings, and to pinpoint the locations of defensive structures, gun positions, and reserves. The 12th Air Army performed air reconnaissance at the beginning of the operation, employing more than 500 sorties for this purpose. These sorties were flown along a broad front (more 1,500 km) and to a great depth. In the first days of the operation the reconnaissance flights were performed at high altitude (up to 5,000-6,000 meters), and in subsequent days they were performed at moderate altitude (1,000-1,500 meters).<sup>6</sup> On the average all of the air armies employed two to three times more sorties to complete this mission than they did in the offensive operations in the western theater of war. Line and area (strip) reconnaissance entailed aerial photography and visual observation.

In order to maintain covertness, airplanes were redeployed to forward airfields in small groups at low altitude while maintaining complete radio silence. This insured surprise in the use of major aviation forces.

Operational interaction between the air force and troops was the most instructive in the Transbaykal Front. Considering the considerable



remoteness of tank formations from the combined arms armies, which were advancing on separated parallel operational axes, only aviation was able to continuously support the advancing major formations and formations throughout the entire depth of the operation. The air divisions interacting with the tank army were commanded by an operational group headed by Air Army Deputy Commander General D. L. Galukov. A mobile radio post provided communication support. It was provided with radar sets for long-range homing. Fighter air divisions were furnished with radar sets to guide airplanes to airborne targets. Forward air controllers furnished with radio sets were allocated to each fighter regiment to organize close-in guidance.

The shortcomings in the planning of interaction should also be noted. Thus one bomber division and a fighter regiment were allocated to support troops on the front's auxiliary axes (Hailar and Kalgon). Airfields intended for maneuver of air units and formations interacting with the 6th Guards Tank Army were not designated quite successfully. Counterstrikes involving joint actions by aviation and tanks were not planned, and bomber actions were not foreseen in the first days of the operation to support the combined arms army advancing on the left wing of the tank army. All of this could have reduced the rate of advance of the frontal troops; this is why the interaction plans were reworked and these shortcomings were eliminated at the start of the operation.

Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov, air force commander in the Far East, was present on the main axis--within the zone of operations of the 12th Air Army--together with his field headquarters at the beginning and in the course of the combat activities. The 9th and 10th air armies and the Pacific Fleet Air Force were controlled by the headquarters of the Far Eastern air force directorate. From the moment the troops entered the Manchurian Plain and until the end of the military campaign, control was exercised through the air force field headquarters at Khabarovsk.

Troops of all three fronts went over to the offensive on the night of 9 August. In order to achieve surprise, it was decided not to perform artillery and air preparation. The troops immediately captured many enemy strongpoints and fortifications.

The success enjoyed by the main forces of the fronts on the main strategic axes helped along the actions of the 9th and 12th air armies. Seventy-six IL-4's struck military objectives in Harbin and Changchun. In order to paralyze the lines of communication, prevent maneuver of reserves, and disturb command and control, the bombers of these air armies and the Pacific Fleet Air Force made two massed strikes in the morning. Three hundred forty-seven bombers participated in the first under the cover of fighter regiments and divisions, and 139 bombers participated in the second.<sup>9</sup>

During the day of 9 August formations and units of the 10th Air Army supported troops of the 2d Far Eastern Front as they crossed water obstacles.

The forward detachments of the strike grouping (6th Guards Tank Army) of the Transbaykal Front surmounted a vast desert by as early as the third day and reached the foothills of the Great Khingan Range, having reached their objective a day ahead of the schedule set by the frontal commander. As a result of the 12th Air Army's activities the Japanese command was unable to bring in reserves in time and assume defensive positions at the passes of the range. Having crossed the Great Khingan Range on four roads, due to a shortage of fuel the tank army was forced to halt as early as on the third and fourth days of the operation and linger there for almost 2 days to bring up its rear.

By decision of the frontal commander the tank army was supplied by transport aviation, which airlifted about 2,450 tons of POL and up to 172 tons of ammunition.<sup>10</sup> Up to 100 LI-2 and SI-47 transport airplanes were scheduled to fly each day; they flew a total of 160-170 sorties per day. The length of their routes was from 400-500 km to 1,000-1,500 km, to include 200-300 km over the Great Khingan Range, the greater part of which was covered by fog and low clouds. There were no airfields or convenient areas for forced landings. Flights were made to places with which radio communication had not been established yet, and the flight crews were unfamiliar with the airfields. Specially created reconnaissance groups that traveled together with the forward units of the ground troops completed their missions successfully in these conditions. Each group contained one or two motor vehicles, a radio set, a mine detector, and the necessary tools. The group reconnoitered the local terrain, sought potential airfield sites, established communication with transport airplanes, and supported their landing.

Activities aimed at achieving air supremacy became unnecessary: On 9 August it was established that the Japanese command had redeployed almost all aviation to airfields in South Korea and the mainland in order to keep aviation intact for defense of the Japanese islands. Therefore the air armies concentrated all of their efforts at supporting frontal troops, which went a long way to promote the success of the operation.

Ground attack and fighter aviation of the 9th Air Army actively supported the frontal troops. The front's strike groupings advanced 40-100 km on two main axes in 5 days of the operation. Air liaison officers possessing powerful radio sets often helped the commanders of rifle and tank divisions that had broken forward and lost communication by reestablishing their communication with the command posts of their armies.

Because of the successful actions of the Transbaykal and 1st Far Eastern fronts, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, commander in chief of the armed forces in the Far East, decided to exploit the offensive of the 2d Far Eastern Front along its entire front, with active air support. In the course of a week its troops destroyed several enemy formations and successfully exploited the offensive deep into Manchuria.

Because ground attack aviation had to operate so far away from its airfields in the course of the swift offensive, by decision of Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov the bomber aviation of the 12th Air Army was given the mission of supporting the tank army of the Transbaykal Front.

Concentrated strikes by ground attack and bomber units and formations were found to be effective. Twelve nine-airplane flights of IL-4's of the XIX Bomber Corps (commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation V. N. Volkov) made a concentrated strike with the goal of annihilating centers of resistance in the Dunin fortified region, besieged by the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front. The bombers followed the lead planes in at an altitude of 600-1000 meters, performing two bomb runs. Capitalizing on the air strike, our troops captured the Dunin fortified region. Centralized control of aviation permitted the air army commanders to concentrate their efforts wherever the situation required. One of the basic properties of the air force--its high mobility--was competently employed.

Extensive interaction was also achieved between the 9th Air Army and troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front. Cases occurred in which bombers and ground attack aircraft supporting one army were reassigned to support another. Concentration of the efforts of the air army in support of the missions of the offensive operation and against particular enemy objectives insured swift advance of the frontal troops. The enemy was subjected to continuous harassment at the same time that troops were being supported on the main strike axes. This continuity was achieved by having ground attack aircraft operate over the battlefield in stacked formation, having each airplane make five to seven attacks, and having bombers systematically strike the lines of communication. Aviation performed its combat activities in difficult meteorological conditions throughout almost the entire course of the operation. When group flights were precluded by bad weather, fighters and ground attack aircraft performed reconnaissance in pairs, attacking the most important enemy objectives as the situation permitted.

The ground troops competently indicated the locations of targets to aviation with colored smoke, rockets, artillery shell bursts, tracer bullets, and visual signals. Of the total number of sorties flown by bomber and ground attack aviation, formations and units of the 9th and 10th air armies flew correspondingly 76 and 72 percent of their sorties to support ground troops and strike fortified regions.

The success of the Transbaykal Front's operation depended to a significant extent on whether or not the enemy would be able to seize the passes over the Great Khingan Range with his reserves. For 5 days following the beginning of combat activities, all rail stations in the (Uchagou)-Taonan and Hailar-(Chzhalan'tun') rail sections were struck by TU-2 and PE-2 airplanes operating in groups of 27-68. In all, bombers of the 12th Air Army flew 85 percent of all of their sorties for this purpose.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast to the actions of the 12th Air Army, the air army of the 1st Far Eastern Front utilized a larger proportion of ground attack airplanes and fighters to isolate reserves from the battlefield; rather than destroying the rail stations, they blocked traffic by destroying trains, locomotives, and rail switches.

Air army rear services did a great deal of work to prepare airfields captured by advancing frontal troops. In just 4 days of the operation seven airfield complexes were prepared in the 12th Air Army. In the period from 9 to 22 August 27 new airfields were built and 13 were restored, while correspondingly 16 and 20 were restored in the 9th and 10th air armies.

After the main forces of the Transbaykal Front reached the central regions of Manchuria, the possibilities for encircling the entire enemy grouping were created. Airborne assault parties consisting of from 50 to 500 men were dropped in the enemy rear near large cities and airfield complexes; this increased the pace of the offensive and played an important role in the final encirclement and defeat of the Kwantung Army.

Airliaison officers carrying radio sets were landed as a rule together with the airborne assault troops. They maintained constant communication with the air army commander and with their own air divisions. When necessary, they could call in aviation units to support the airborne troops. The air force flew up to 5,400 sorties to land assault troops and to cover and support the landings. In all, about 16,500 men, 2,776 tons of POL, 550 tons of ammunition and 1,500 tons of various cargo were carried by air. About 30 percent of the sorties flown by transport aviation had the purpose of reconnaissance in behalf of airborne assault parties. During the operation the transport aviation and communication aviation of the three air armies flew up to 7,650 sorties, to include 2,329 by the 9th Army, 1,323 by the 10th, and 3,998 by the 12th.<sup>12</sup>

The Kwantung Army was destroyed in 10 days. During this short period of time the air force flew about 18,000 sorties (more than 22,000 counting those of the Pacific Fleet Air Force). These sorties distribute themselves quantitatively as follows: up to 44 percent to support troops and fight reserves; up to 25 percent for aerial reconnaissance; about 30 percent in behalf of assault landing parties, to carry personnel and cargo, and to organize communications and control (Table 2).

Our air forces flew only 94 sorties (about 0.9 percent) against enemy airfields. This was explained by the fact that enemy air units and formations had been withdrawn to airfields beyond the range of our frontal bombers. Fighters flew more than 4,200 sorties to cover troops and to escort airplanes belonging to other air arms. It should be emphasized that there had been no real need for committing such large numbers of fighters to these missions, since enemy aviation was almost totally inoperative.



Table 2. Distribution of Sorties Flown by Aviation in the Manchurian Operation for Different Objectives\*

(1) Авиационные объединения	(2) бомбовые и штурмовые удары	(7) Другие боевые задачи									(6) Всего
	(3) по войскам и объектам районов	(4) по войскам и объектам	(5) по ж.-д. объектам	(6) всего	(8) на разведку	(9) на сопровождение	(10) на прикрытие войск	(11) прочие задачи			
9 BA (12)	1869	—	563	2432	932	477	229	342	4412		
10 BA (13)	648	45	207	900	891	522	972	12	3297		
12 BA (14)	40	45	535	624	767	301	457	212	2361		
Всего по BA (15)	2557	94	1295	3946	2590	1300	1658	666	10100		
BBC TOB (16)	696	—	487	1183	885	736	889	759	4412		
Итого: (6)	3253	94	1782	5129	3475	2036	2547	1365	14562		

\* The table was compiled on the basis of data from TsAMO SSSR, f. 360, op. 21858, d. 2; f. 5782, op. 226012, d. 1; f. 349, op. 109446, d. 1.

Key:

- |   |                              |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Major air formations                 | 9. For escort                |
| 2. Bombing and ground attack strikes    | 10. To cover troops          |
| 3. Against troops and fortified regions | 11. Other missions           |
| 4. Against airfields                    | 12. 9th Air Army             |
| 5. Against rail facilities              | 13. 10th Air Army            |
| 6. Total                                | 14. 12th Air Army            |
| 7. Other missions                       | 15. Total for the air armies |
| 8. For reconnaissance                   | 16. Pacific Fleet Air Force  |

The frontal air armies suffered significant losses. Out of the total number of combat losses, 64 percent of the airplanes were missing in action, 30.5 percent were knocked down by antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machinegun fire, 1.3 percent were knocked down in air battles, and 4.2 percent were destroyed at the airfields by enemy artillery fire. Up to 37 percent of the airplane losses were not associated with combat. The principal reason for this lay in inadequate training with the new materiel and the poor knowledge personnel arriving from the west had of the unique features of the theater of war. The pilots underwent 2 weeks of training in complex meteorological and geographic conditions.<sup>13</sup>

The air force was able to do in the course of the Manchurian operation what it had not always managed to do during combat activities in the western theater of war--disorganize rail shipments and successfully fight reserves.

As a result the Japanese ~~armies~~ could only make partial use of rail lines of communication to maneuver its troops; the regions of combat activities were isolated from fresh forces, and the enemy was unable to evacuate material valuables from the border strip or withdraw his troops from strikes by advancing formations of the Soviet Army.

The experience of the Manchurian operation shows that in the conditions of the swift advance by our troops, during which the situation changed especially quickly, aerial reconnaissance became not only the principal but sometimes the sole means for quickly obtaining reliable information on the enemy and his intentions.

The combat activities of the air force in the Manchurian strategic operation confirmed the validity of the support principle, observance of which made it possible to fully utilize the maneuvering possibilities of aviation, to control air formations centrally, and to mass them on the axes of the main strikes of the fronts. Because the three strategic axes of the theater of war were separated from one another, the closest possible interaction had to be organized and maintained between the air force and the ground troops. Despite the tremendous scope of the combat activities, control of aviation was kept centralized during preparations for the operation and during part of its course. The principal communication resources employed were radio and wire links, and airplanes of air communication subunits and units of the air armies.

In terms of the scope and swiftness of the offensive and principal strategic goals attained at the very beginning of the war, the combat activities of the ground troops and the air force in the Manchurian operation have no equals in all of World War II. It is important to study this experience, especially that of organizing and maintaining interaction between the air force and the ground troops; this experience has theoretical and practical significance to air force strategy and tactics.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1975, p 5.
2. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], f. 132-a, op. 2642, d. 39, l. 155.
3. Ibid., f. 360, op. 6134, d. 41, l. 22.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1975, p 66.
5. Ibid.
6. TsAMO, f. 349, op. 142201, d. 1, ll. 100-101.
7. Ibid., f. 210, op. 310177, d. 1, l. 32.

8. "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" (The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945), Voenizdat, 1968, p 429.
9. VOENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1975, p 68.
10. TsAMO, f. 360, op. 515277, d. 1, l. 89.
11. "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945," p 435.
12. "Deystviya VVS po razgromu yaponskoy armii v 1945 (operativno-takticheskiy ocherk)" (Actions of the Air Force to Defeat the Japanese Army in 1945 (Operational-Tactical Outline)), Voenizdat, 1951, p 116.
13. "Deystviya VVS po razgromu yaponskoy armii v 1945 (operativno-takticheskiy ocherk," Voenizdat, 1951, pp 117-118.

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## FUEL SUPPLY OPERATIONS DURING KURSK COUNTEROFFENSIVE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 25-30

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by Engr-Col Gen V. Nikitin: "Supplying Troops With Fuel During the Kursk Counteroffensive"]

[Text] In spring 1943, on the eve of the summer campaign, the State Defense Committee devoted considerable attention to accumulating the materiel required by the fronts for their offensive operations; this included creation of a fuel reserve. By this time, tremendous quantities of combat equipment--tanks, airplanes, motor vehicles, and prime movers--had been concentrated on the most important strategic axes, particularly in the vicinity of the Kursk salient and the Orel bulge. All five tank armies, a significant proportion of the tank and mechanized corps and of heavy tank regiments intended for penetration of defenses (about 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns),<sup>1</sup> and about 5,000 airplanes<sup>2</sup> were located in this area. Moreover troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, and Steppe fronts possessed 150,000 motor vehicles, many tractors, and other equipment. This tremendous quantity of combat equipment could be used effectively only on the condition that gasoline, diesel fuel, and oils were supplied promptly and completely to the troops.

It would be difficult to explain in full volume, within the limits of this article, all of the work done to provide fuel to the troops in the battle of Kursk; therefore let us dwell only on the problems of accumulating and storing fuel reserves and organizing fuel deliveries during the counteroffensive.

Accumulation of fuel reserves in the troops to support major offensive operations always depended on the availability of petroleum products that could be allocated by the country to the armed forces. The potentials of petroleum industry were limited in 1943, because in contrast to the situation in many other sectors of heavy industry, petroleum had not yet attained the 1941 level. Meanwhile, the troops received more and more new combat equipment, which meant growth in consumption of fuel and greater requirements on its quality.



The State Defense Committee took steps to accelerate petroleum extraction and refining. A State Defense Committee decree dated 22 September 1942 on developing oil drilling along the Volga, in the Urals, in the Kazakh SSR, and in Central Asia had important significance. Nevertheless the fuel availability was limited in 1943. This is why beginning in spring 1943 the fuel demand of the troops was satisfied in part by fuel and oil substitutes. Permission for their use (this was a temporary measure) was formalized by orders from the Peoples Commissariat of Defense. As an example a mixture of kerosene and mineral oil was used instead of diesel fuel, and kerosene or ligroin and even diesel was added to motor vehicle gasoline. Alcohol-gasoline mixtures were also used in motor vehicles.

One of the significant sources for accumulating fuel reserves was strict economization of fuel, a practice introduced into the Soviet Army in August 1942. Commanders of all ranks were given the direct responsibility of determining the fuel consumption limits when planning fuel supply, and monitoring fuel consumption.

Strictly considering all possibilities, the State Defense Committee obligated, by special decree, the Fuel Supply Directorate (USG) to create reserves of fuel and lubricants of all types weighing a total of 100,000 tons in troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, and Southwestern fronts; this included 20 rations of aviation gasoline and 15 rations of tank fuel.<sup>3</sup>

Such a tremendous quantity of fuel had never been concentrated in such a relatively small area. The main difficulties stemmed from the fact that it was impossible to store all of the required fuel reserves in troop, army, and frontal dumps. National economic petroleum dumps within the territories of the fronts were few in number; moreover many of them had been damaged by the enemy. In addition, the fuel had to be transported great distances from the production bases, and the possibilities of rail transportation were limited, especially within the combat zone of the Central and the Voronezh fronts.

A group of officers headed by the USG chief, Major General M. I. Kormilitsyn, was sent at the end of May to the Bryansk, Central, and Voronezh fronts and the Steppe Military District (reorganized as a front on 9 July) to render practical assistance to workers of the fuel supply service in planning fuel support in the most sensible manner, to study the possibilities for storing fuel at the dumps, and to organize reception of rail cars carrying fuel.<sup>4</sup> This group made meticulous computations to determine the expected fuel consumption during preparations for and in the course of the operation. An analysis showed that the amount of fuel allocated by GKO [State Defense Committee] was fully sufficient to support the forthcoming combat activities.

The way fuel reserves were disposed in depth in each front had its unique features, and it was determined by decisions made concerning rear

organization. Thus despite the fact that the troops of the Central Front were preparing for intentional defense, the rear, to include fuel support, was organized as it would have been in an offensive operation--that is, rear services and units as well as materiel reserves were brought as close to the troops as possible. More than half of the fuel reserves were placed directly within the divisions and regiments. Some of the frontal fuel reserves were also brought near troops in the vicinities of Kursk, Fatezh, and Zolotukhino.

It was very difficult to complete this mission due to a shortage of fuel containers despite the help given to the front by central organizations. Only greater effort on the part of officers seeking containers and packaging locally under the supervision of the chief of the fuel supply section, Colonel N. I. Lozhkin, made it possible to fulfill the directive of the frontal military council. As subsequent events showed such disposition of fuel within the front was basically justified, since uninterrupted supply of fuel to the troops raised the stability of defenses and permitted the troops to go over to the counteroffensive without an operational pause.

Special attention had to be devoted to coordinating train traffic carrying fuel, since only one rail section--Yasturnaya-Shehigry-Kursk--was used to deliver fuel to the Central and the Voronezh fronts until mid-July (that is, until construction of the Staryy Oskol-Rzhava branch was completed), and the capacity frontal dumps had for receiving fuel from the railroad was limited.

Materiel, including fuel, was distributed somewhat differently in the Voronezh Front. The reserves created in the troops were basically within the established norms. Only some of the frontal reserves were advanced to the vicinity of Solntsevo and Rzhava. The bulk of the fuel, meanwhile, was located deep within the frontal rear, 280-380 km from the forward edge, and even beyond the rear area at local petroleum dumps, since not enough fuel tanks could be found within the limits of the front.

The chief of the frontal fuel supply section (Military Engineer 1st Rank P. L. Ivanov, and later Colonel B. Ya. Sinitsyn) devoted a great deal of attention to concealing the fuel reserves. He stubbornly insisted on burying not only moveable tanks with a capacity of 15-17 cubic meters, but also the stationary tanks of local petroleum dumps with a capacity of 200 cubic meters.

The Steppe Front accumulated its fuel reserves with a consideration for having to move them prior to the start of the counteroffensive. In this connection the front received, on proposal from the USC, additional moveable tanks and containers, and its fuel consumption limit for combat preparations and the troop regrouping was increased.

Moreover in order to improve fuel supply to the troops our group wrote out a number of practical recommendations that were subsequently approved by

the Soviet Army chief of rear services, and brought them to the attention of the frontal rear services. As an example we suggested having not more than 10 large tank cars in a train. We recommended that empty tank cars be sent to the filling points only by special routes, and only as required. All trains were to be loaded only at night, and transfer of fuel from one train (containing 10 tank cars) was not to take more than 4 hours.

Coupled with completion of the Staryy Oskol-Rzhava rail section, these measures significantly increased fuel traffic and insured its protection against enemy aviation.

Taking account of the experience of the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the Fuel Supply Directorate created significant aviation fuel reserves (about 10,000 barrels) at Moscow dumps and airfields for express air delivery, and it prepared 150 tank trucks and 200 trucks carrying fuel for land vehicles as an emergency reserve for troops participating in the counteroffensive at Kursk.<sup>5</sup>

The greatest difficulties were encountered by central organizations and the front in accumulating aviation and motor vehicle gasoline. Thus by summer 1943 the reserves of aviation fuel decreased in the fronts owing to their significant consumption during major air operations in the spring and the intense combat training of the personnel. This is why the Central, Voronezh, Bryansk, Steppe, and Western fronts had only 13 aviation rations by the beginning of the offensive, as opposed to the 20 established by the GKO. Moreover delivery of this fuel from the country's rear was often delayed due to overloading of the railroads by operational shipments.

The shortage of aviation gasoline was felt especially keenly in the Central and Voronezh fronts, the aviation of which took an active part in the defensive engagement. It would be sufficient to state that in July, the Central Front consumed 25 percent and the Voronezh Front consumed 30 percent of all of the aviation fuel expended by five fronts.<sup>6</sup> While for example the 2d Air Army (fuel supply section chief, Engineer-Captain S. V. Tel'nov) of the Voronezh Front possessed more than 4,500 tons of aviation gasoline at the beginning of the defensive engagement, by the beginning of the counteroffensive its total reserves dropped to 1,500 tons.<sup>7</sup> In all during the counteroffensive, between 3 and 23 August, the army flew 28,000 sorties (an average of 930 sorties per day) and consumed 11,500 tons of aviation fuel. This was 7.7 times more than was present at the beginning of the counteroffensive.

The rate of rail traffic carrying fuel was increased significantly during the counteroffensive by reducing the deliveries of aviation fuel to fronts not participating in the battle of Kursk and by changing the organization of deliveries. As a result the troops had enough aviation gasoline, but motor transportation had to move the final distance of 200-250 km from the terminal rail stations. Given a limited quantity of fueling trucks (for example the 2d Air Army need 180 tank trucks but possessed only 150), the motor transport subunits had to work more intensively.

In the hardest period of the work of accumulating aviation fuel reserves the enemy managed to annihilate a large quantity of motor vehicle gasoline at dumps in Saratov and to knock out the Saratov Petroleum Refinery. The resulting deficit of motor vehicle gasoline on the Kursk axis (22,000 tons) was compensated by its additional production at other plants, by reduction of deliveries to other fronts and to the national economy, and by partial release of motor vehicle gasoline from mobilization reserves.

Fuel supply organization was thought out well in the 11th Guards Army (fuel supply section chief, Engineer-Major F. P. Brodov). In May 1943 Lieutenant General I. Kh. Bagramyan, the army commander, approved the plan of logistical support to troops in the offensive operation (it was to last 25-30 days, and its depth was to be 120-150 km).<sup>8</sup> The plan foresaw accumulating three fuel rations in the troops, and maintaining maneuverable fuel reserves totaling two fuel rations in the army field dump. According to the plan, there were to be two fuel rations in the troops and 1-1.5 fuel rations in the army dump by the end of the operation.

The maneuverable reserves consisted of fuel packaged in barrels and cans that could be brought up to the troops in panel trucks. This was extremely important considering the limited quantity of tank trucks.

Good preparation of fuel supply agencies for the operation doubtlessly promoted the fact that the army formations attained a high rate of advance in the first days. Later, however, in the course of the successful offensive, army lines of communication grew to 150-180 km. Because paved roads were unavailable, cargo-laden motor columns had to move slowly. It took from 3 to 5 days to make a single trip. Army motor transportation was unable to insure prompt delivery of materiel. The commander of the Western Front reinforced the army with the 16th Motor Transport Regiment of the Supreme High Command Reserves, which had a strength of 300 motor vehicles. This made it possible for the army's rear services to insure swift delivery of all materiel, including fuel, to the formations and units. By the end of the operation the army possessed a sufficient reserve of fuel to continue the offensive.

Many army fuel supply section chiefs tried to create standard fuel reserves in the troops and reserves as large as possible at the army dumps. This was especially typical of the tank armies. This desire was fully justified. Although army dumps were serviced by rail, their capability for advancing detachments and the presence, in the tank armies, of motor transport resources having a capacity that was relatively considerable for that time, made it possible to promptly move the fuel reserves forward with the advancing units, and consequently to achieve uninterrupted troop support.

A motor vehicle gasoline reserve of 3.5 rations and reserve of diesel fuel and ligroin totaling four fuel rations was created in the Bryansk Front's 63d Army (fuel supply section chief, Major G. I. Nikiforov) by the beginning of the offensive. In this case more than 70 percent of the

fuel reserves were in the troops (see Table). Without a doubt this significantly increased the independence of the units and formations as they penetrated enemy defenses, but it was not enough to insure uninterrupted support to further offensive actions.

#### Disposition of the 63d Army's Fuel Reserves in Depth

(1) Соединения, части и учреждения	(2) Количество					
	(3) автомобильная		(4) дизельная		(7) лигроин	
	(4) в т	(5) л. прав. ках	(4) в т	(5) л. прав. ках	(4) в т	(5) л. прав. ках
Стрелковые дивизии (8)	109	3.0	1	3.0	9	2.2
Артиллерийские части (9)	218	2.0	44	3.6	76	3.0
Армейские части (10)	94	2.9	—	—	—	—
Тыловые части и учреждения (11)	118	4.0	318	3.3	—	—
Армейский склад горючего (12)	189	0.9	100	0.9	70	1.8
(13) Итого:	728		463		155	

#### Key:

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Formations, units, and services | 7. Ligroin                  |
| 2. Quantity                        | 8. Rifle divisions          |
| 3. Motor vehicle gasoline          | 9. Artillery units          |
| 4. Tons                            | 10. Army units              |
| 5. Fuel rations                    | 11. Rear services and units |
| 6. Diesel Fuel                     | 12. Army fuel dumps         |
|                                    | 13. Total                   |

The troops felt the need for motor vehicle gasoline especially keenly. Just to replenish reserves consumed by the 63d Army, for example, by 10 August the front delivered 1,900 tons of motor vehicle gasoline--that is, 2.6 times more than the reserves present in the army at the beginning of the operation. In all from 10 July to 10 August, army troops received more than 3,000 tons of fuel, to include 720 tons directly from the army dump, 530 tons from its first detachment, and 1,800 tons from its second detachment and from rail tank cars.<sup>9</sup>

It would have been impossible to deliver the large quantities of fuel required by this army over the great distances, had the rail troops not restored the railroad to Orel quickly. Tank cars were moved along this railroad to stations closest to the troops. A significant part of the fuel was issued to troop motor transportation directly from the rail tank cars, bypassing the army dumps and their detachments.



The experience of accumulating fuel reserves and utilizing them in the Kursk counteroffensive permits certain conclusions. Thus it was during preparations for the Kursk counteroffensive that measures were developed and implemented for the first time to organize delivery of large quantities of fuel from central production bases and dumps over significant distances in the face of intense enemy air activity against the delivery routes. The troops received rich experience in accumulating and storing tremendous quantities of fuel in a limited area in the face of a scarcity of storage tanks caused mainly by the enemy's destruction of local petroleum dumps.

Despite the meticulous preparations, certain difficulties in providing fuel to the troops arose in connection with its heightened consumption at certain times during the Orel and the Belgorod-Khar'kov operations, and especially in their concluding phases. There was an especially great need for aviation and motor vehicle gasoline. Although the Central and Voronezh fronts did receive significant quantities of extra fuel, the motor vehicle gasoline reserves dropped by 29 percent and those of aviation gasoline dropped by 30 percent by the end of the operation in comparison with the beginning of the offensive. At the same time there turned out to be an excess of diesel fuel, and a significant proportion of it was left back in the forming-up places. The reason for this lay in the fact that the intensity with which motor transportation was used, and with which aviation was employed in combat, greatly exceeded the planned intensity, and the demand for diesel fuel was determined without sufficient consideration of the probable losses of tanks in the defensive engagement. As a result the consumption of this type of fuel turned out to be below that planned.

As experience showed, given large fuel reserves in the fronts and armies, the troops could be supplied without interruption if the reserves are moved promptly together with the advancing formations, and if they are constantly replenished by delivering fuel from frontal and army dumps.

The high fuel consumption during the Kursk counteroffensive can be explained by greater availability of combat equipment in the Soviet Army. While more than 42,000 tons of fuel were consumed in the Stalingrad counteroffensive,<sup>10</sup> 130,000 tons were expended in the Kursk counteroffensive.

On the whole the fuel supply service managed to complete its mission during the battle of Kursk. Its experience of accumulating and storing large fuel reserves was broadly utilized in preparations for and conduct of subsequent major offensive operations of the Soviet Army, and to determine the optimum dimensions of troops fuel reserves in the war years.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" (History of World War II 1939-1945), Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1976, pp 159, 172.

2. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], f. 35, op. 74313, d. 6, l. 274, 375.
3. "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" (The Soviet Armed Forces Rear Services in the Great Patriotic War), Voenizdat, 1977, p 180.
4. In the period described here, Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Nikitin was a USG section chief, and he took a part in this group's work--Editor.
5. "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil...", p 181.
6. Computed on the basis of TsAMO documents, f. 35, op 74313, d. 6.
7. TsAMO, f. 302, op. 4213, d. 35, l, 2.
8. Ibid., f. 358, op. 5942, d. 9, l. 2; d. 10, l. 36.
9. TsAMO, f. 420, op. 11078, d. 4a, ll. 15-17.
10. "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil...", p 180.

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## TULUBKO DESCRIBES WARTIME ARTILLERY OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 37-42

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Army Gen V. Tolubko: "Artillery of the 2d Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation"]

[Text] At the beginning of August 1944 the Supreme High Command General Headquarters ordered the troop commanders of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts, army generals R. Ya. Malinovskiy and P. I. Tolbukhin, to prepare and conduct a major strategic offensive operation in the vicinity of the cities of Iasi and Kishinev, to destroy the troops of Army Group Southern Ukraine, complete the liberation of the Moldavian SSR, and knock Romania, which was fighting on the side of fascist Germany, out of the war.\*

The 3d Ukrainian Front was faced by defending troops of the German 6th Army and the Romanian 3d Army, the total strength of which was 18 divisions and one brigade.\*\*

Front commander Army General P. I. Tolbukhin decided to make his main strike from a bridgehead south of Bendery using the forces of the 57th and 37th armies, the greater part of the forces of the 46th Army, the VII and IV Guards Mechanized corps, and the 17th Air Army in the general direction of (Opach), (Selemet), and Husi, and to encircle and annihilate the German 6th Army in interaction with the 2d Ukrainian Front. Part of the forces of the 46th Army were to interact with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla in an auxiliary strike aimed at defeating the Romanian 3d Army.

At the beginning of the operation the front possessed two breakthrough artillery divisions, four antiaircraft artillery divisions, 11 separate artillery and mortar brigades, and 97 separate regiments. In all,

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\* "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" (History of World War II 1939-1945), Vol 9, Voenizdat, 1978, p 99.

\*\* "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945), Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1962, p 260.

it possessed 6,233 guns, and mortars with calibers of 76 mm and above, 464 field rocket launchers, and 649 antiaircraft guns.\*

Frontal artillery commander Colonel General of Artillery M. I. Nedelin suggested to the military council that the front concentrate, on the axis of the main strike, all field artillery belonging to the reserve of the Supreme High Command (except for three regiments), 26 antiaircraft artillery regiments, the artillery regiments of the 5th Strike Army's three rifle divisions, and corps and divisional artillery regiments of the X Guards Rifle Corps, which was in the frontal reserve.

This made it possible to concentrate 4,587 guns and mortars--more than 73 percent of all field artillery available to the front--within the breakthrough sectors of the 57th, 37th, and 46th armies, which had a total breadth of 18 km. While the average density within the zone of the front was 24 guns and mortars per kilometer of front line, in the breakthrough sectors it was as follows: 247 guns and mortars of 76 mm caliber and higher in the 57th Army, 251 in the 37th Army, and 239 in the 26th Army, per kilometer of front line.

This was the first time in the entire existence of the front that massing was so decisive, and it insured a more than sixfold superiority over the enemy. It was later told to me that when Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin presented, at a meeting of the military council, the grounds for his proposals and his calculations for the use of artillery, everyone became envious of his bold thinking, but at the same time a few people expressed reservations. His idea was too risky. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, who was present at the meeting as liaison officer from the Supreme High Command General Headquarters, asked:

"Do I understand correctly that you, Comrade Nedelin, suggest taking almost all of General Berzarin's\*\* artillery reinforcements and adding to them another three artillery regiments from the rifle divisions? What would be left with then?"

"With artillery, Comrade Marshal."

"What artillery?"

"He will still have 11 field artillery and mortar regiments and one anti-aircraft artillery regiment. The army will have 933 guns and mortars," Nedelin replied.

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\* "Voina Sovetskikh Vooruzhennukh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" (Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945), Vol III, Voenizdat, 1958, p 470.

\*\* Commander of the 5th Strike Army.

"That's all?"

"Yes!"

"Then what would be the density in his 126-kilometer zone?"

"Seven point four guns and mortars per kilometer of front, Comrade Marshal."

"You intend to have that little on the axis upon which the main forces of the German 6th Army are concentrated? If General (Frisner)\* finds out about this, he could order General (Fretter-Piko), commander of the 6th Army to immediately make an anticipatory strike, and all of our plans will fail. You are being a little too bold, my boy.... Does it make sense to take such a risk?"

"It does, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union," the artillery commander maintained his ground. "We will apply all of our strength, knowledge, and accumulated experience to regroup the artillery and mortar regiments without the enemy knowing about it. Moreover we are presently simulating concentration of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Division from the Karelian Front on the Kishinev axis, in the vicinity of Grigoriopol'. And in order to mislead the enemy and make him think that the division is concentrating precisely in this area, we have set up a high-power artillery battery at gun positions and shot several rounds from its guns. Let the fascists keep on thinking that we will be making our main strike on the Kishinev axis, rather than from the bridgehead south of Bendery. This will force the German generals to abandon the thought of counterstrike and commit all of their forces to reinforcement of occupied lines so as to repel the imaginary main strike of our troops."

"Well done! If the military council is set on approving the artillery grouping suggested by Comrade Nedelin, I will not stand in its way," S. K. Timoshenko said in conclusion.

The plan of artillery support to the operation was approved without a single amendment.

This plan foresaw creation of a coordinated system of artillery groups. Each rifle regiment, division, corps, and army commander possessed his own artillery group. Moreover all mortar companies of rifle battalions in the assault echelon of the divisions and mortar companies brought in from back-up echelons for the time of artillery preparation and support of the attack were combined into regimental mortar groups. Colonel I. V. Grishchenko's 9th Tank Destroyer Artillery Brigade was used as the basis

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\* Commander of the fascist German Army Group Southern Ukraine.



for creating a frontal antitank artillery reserve. Direct-laying artillery was to have a density of not less than 30-35 guns per kilometer of breakthrough sector.

Artillery preparation was to last 1 hour 45 minutes. Its schedule foresaw a sequence of four 5-minute artillery strikes succeeding one another in different intervals of time and coupled with periods of suppression and false transfer of fire.

All artillery groups and Guards mortar regiments armed with M-13 rockets were to participate in the first artillery strike. Then the most important targets were to be suppressed by battery fire for 45 minutes. During this time the mortars were to destroy the first three trenches, while artillery of the infantry support groups was to suppress close-in manpower and fire weapons and punch holes through minefields. The second artillery strike, in which all artillery was to participate (to include direct-laying guns, which were to go into action 10 minutes after the beginning of artillery preparation) was to be followed by 15 minutes of false transfer of fire involving 40 percent of the artillery resources. Following the latter, a third 5-minute artillery strike was to be made against the forward edge and the enemy's front lines of defense; then all artillery resources were to engage in a second 25-minute period of suppression.

Artillery preparation was to end with a strike by all artillery and mortars against the forward edge.

Artillery support to the attack was to involve a standard moving barrage coupled with successive concentration of fire to a depth of 1.5-2 km from the forward edge against three or four principal lines. Artillery support foresaw successive concentration of fire by artillery in covered fire positions, and fire by direct-laying support guns. Artillery support to commitments of the IV Guards and VII Mechanized corps to the breakthrough was assigned to artillery of the Supreme High Command Headquarters Reserve, as well as to artillery of the 37th and 46th armies. One tank destroyer artillery brigade, two light and one howitzer artillery regiments, one mortar regiment, one rocket regiment, and one antiaircraft artillery division were taken out of the composition of each of these major formations. The following were also brought in to support the breakthrough by the mechanized formations indicated above: field artillery and mortars of rifle units in the assault echelon; infantry support groups of those rifle divisions within the zones of which the corps were to be committed; corps and army artillery groups.

Eighty-five percent of all antiaircraft artillery was earmarked for anti-aircraft cover to the troops. Army antiaircraft artillery groups commanded by company antiaircraft artillery commanders were created in the armies.

It should be noted that the troops also underwent regrouping at full steam at the time the operation was being planned. Twenty-seven divisions out

of 37, all tank and mechanized formations and units, and more than 75 percent of the artillery and mortars were concentrated on the bridgehead and the east bank of the Dniester contiguous with it in a strip 25 km wide in the period from 13 to 28 August 1944.

The troops and combat equipment were regrouped according to a single plan developed by the frontal staff, and only at night while maintaining the strictest secrecy in the face of enemy reconnaissance. A special plan of operational camouflage and deception was developed for this purpose. It was based on creating a false strike troop grouping on the Kishinev axis. Intense rail traffic was maintained, the loading of troops aboard trains was simulated, wandering guns and mortars fired at the enemy, and as twilight set in columns of tanks, artillery, and infantry were moved out of areas of actual concentration into false areas of concentration. At night these columns returned to their previous places of deployment. Improvised shelters and dugouts were built and dummy tanks, guns, and vehicles were set up in places of false concentration. High-power artillery batteries of the 5th Strike Army fired against the enemy's permanent fire positions on 17 and 18 August. The false concentration area was dependably covered by antiaircraft artillery and fighters.

Artillery formations and units began regrouping as early as in the first days of August. Of the 170 artillery and mortar regiments in the front, 113 re-deployed to new positions. A significant quantity of them were moved distances up to 90 km. The subunits and units marched only at night while complying strictly with light camouflage measures. Artillery prime movers and transport vehicles moved on dusty country and forest roads with their headlights off, and as dawn began to break they halted and camouflaged themselves meticulously until twilight. Arriving regiments and battalions also occupied new launching areas only at night. These areas were prepared under the guidance of the army artillery commanders and their chiefs of staff back in June-July by artillery units performing defense missions.

Artillery of the 37th, 67th, and 46th armies was registered from 14 to 19 August only with ranging guns. Use of new calibers and disturbance of the fire routine that had been established in the defensive period were categorically prohibited.

As a result of all these artfully implemented measures the command of Army Group Southern Ukraine was misled concerning the axis of the main strike and the time the offensive of the Soviet troops was to begin.

Our aviation appeared over the enemy's dispositions at 0800 hours sharp on 20 August. Squadron after squadron of bombers and attack aircraft hit their targets. Volleys of thousands of guns and mortars were fired simultaneously. Artillery preparation began. The bursts of the gunshells, mortar shells, and bombs merged into a single mighty thunder. The sky above the bridgehead was blanketed by smoke and dust. The grass was darkened by the soot.

Fifty-five minutes later the frontal artillery commander gave the signal for false transfer of fire deep into the defenses; 40 percent of the artillery began firing at targets in the second and third trenches and deeper in. The rest of the artillery remained silent.

Concurrently the rifle subunits in the first trench opened intense rifle and machinegun fire and began hurling artfully fabricated dummies out of the trenches with cries of "Hurrah!" This diversionary attack, which was foreseen by the plan of the operation, was concluded by the enemy to be the actual attack. Surviving Germans abandoned their shelters, took their places in the trenches, and prepared themselves to repel the attacking subunits of Soviet troops. After 15 minutes of silence the rest of the artillery concentrated the entire power of its fire at the forward edge and immediately behind it, inflicting considerable losses on enemy manpower.

At 0945 hours infantry swiftly attacked the forward edge of the fascist defenses (direct infantry support tanks were committed to battle from the first trench). Artillery and mortars were relocated for their support. Units in the assault echelon were successful due to the good results of artillery fire during the preparation for the attack and due to excellently organized interaction of infantry with artillery and aviation. The offensive proceeded at a high rate. By the end of the day troops of the 37th and 46th armies advanced 11-12 km, penetrated the main line of defense, the second line in some areas, and created favorable conditions for commitment of frontal mobile formations to the breakthrough. The second day of the operation began with powerful counterattacks by the enemy's 13th Tank and 153d Infantry divisions, which had been transferred to the breakthrough sector at night. Rifle formations committed to the engagement by the IV Guards and VII Mechanized corps took them on in a decisive battle with the support of frontal aviation and artillery. The 1,512th, 1,961st, and 1,962d tank destroyer artillery regiments under the command of majors I. Ye. Rybalko, A. M. Lebedenko, and A. A. Padurovskiy and the 58th Guards Rocket Launcher Regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. M. Nizkov, which advanced at the head of the columns of the IV Guards Mechanized Corps, deployed boldly in front of the combat formations of the motorized infantry battalions of the mechanized brigades in the face of the counterattacking enemy's rifle and machinegun fire, hit the enemy with accurate artillery fire, and together with tanks and motorized riflemen forced the enemy to retreat.

The gunners operated just as boldly and decisively in other sectors as well. Their high proficiency and their unshakable faith in their superiority over the enemy could be sensed everywhere. As a result by as early as the first half of 21 August great losses were inflicted upon the enemy, and he was forced to begin retreating. Exploiting the success of the combined actions and interacting with them, the mechanized corps advancing on the main axis began to move forward quickly, deepening the breakthrough to 25-30 km. The IV Mechanized Corps, which was operating within the zone of the 46th Army, penetrated 50 km into enemy defenses and reached the Chaga River by the end of the day.

As a result of the successes of the Soviet troops, by the end of 21 August favorable conditions were created for encirclement and annihilation of the enemy in the vicinity of Kishinev by forces of the 3d and 2d Ukrainian fronts. The evolved situation elicited the need for maximally decentralizing control over the artillery groups and units of the 3d Ukrainian Front. General Nadelin ordered the army artillery commanders, generals A. Ye. Breydo and M. S. Alekseyenko and Colonel V. P. Chistyakov, to concentrate the bulk of their artillery resources in the rifle divisions, to reinforce rifle regiments with divisional artillery, and to attach an artillery or a mortar battalion to each rifle battalion and an artillery or a mortar battery to each rifle company. The rifle division artillery commanders were left with only one attached artillery regiment. The rifle corps artillery possessed gun brigades and rocket launcher battalions, and army artillery commanders possessed army long-range artillery groups, rocket launcher regiments, and mobile antitank reserves.

Such a grouping made it possible to utilize the bulk of the most mobile and maneuverable artillery for direct support to rifle subunits, and to mass this artillery against the most important sectors of the front; it also made it possible to use mobile reserves to reinforce threatened axes and fight enemy tanks.

On 23 August the mobile formations of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian front met in the vicinities of Husi and (Leovo) on the Prut River and closed their ring of encirclement about the German 6th Army, while General I. T. Shlemkin's 46th Army encircled the Romanian 3d Army with the cooperation of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla.

The actions of artillery were most diverse during the time of liquidation of the encircled enemy. In addition to firing from covered gun positions, the gunners often had to engage in direct-laying fire and even fight the enemy hand-to-hand. In a number of cases individual artillery units operated without infantry, defending some sectors of the front on their own.

The Iasi-Kishinev operation ended with a truly triumphant success for the Soviet Armed Forces. As a result of its successful outcome the entire strategic situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front changed dramatically. Liberation of the Moldavian SSR was completed, and Romania was forced out of the war on fascist Germany's side; Romanian laborers triumphantly met the Soviet Army of Liberation. The road to countries of the Balkan Peninsula and into Hungary was opened. Favorable conditions were created for a deep envelopment of the entire southern strategic flank of fascist Germany.

Hundreds of privates, sergeants, officers, and generals were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title and thousands of soldiers earned orders and medals for their bravery and valor, and for competent leadership of subunits, units, formations, and major formations.

A large number of military units and formations were also awarded orders. They were earned by 12 artillery and mortar regiments, seven artillery and mortar brigades, two breakthrough artillery divisions, and two of the front's antiaircraft artillery divisions.

Moreover 15 artillery units and formations were awarded the honorary Kishinev, Lower Dubrovnik, Izmail, Galati, and Braila titles.

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## GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONAL POST FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 42-46

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences (Ret) Maj Gen S. Bronevskiy: "Information on the General Staff Operational Post in the Leningrad Sector (October-November 1941)"]

[Text] On the night of 28 September 1941, as I was completing my summary of the day's battle results on the Western axis, I was summoned by Colonel V. V. Kurasov who announced that a decision had been made to create, in the Leningrad sector in the vicinity of Volkhov, an operational post of the General Staff Directorate, to which a small group of officers was assigned. He (Kurasov) was appointed chief of the post, and I was to be his deputy. The communications center had already been organized. It was headed by an experienced signalman, Major General of Signal Troops T. P. Kargapolov. We were to take off the next day, 29 September.

The operational post had to be organized because of the difficult troop command and control conditions that had evolved in this sector. By this time the enemy had reached the gates of Lenin's city, while troops pushing further eastward attained the Neva, capturing Shlissel'burg and the Mga rail terminal. Beginning with 8 September communication could be maintained with Leningrad only via Lake Ladoga and by air.\*

In addition to troops of the Leningrad Front that were defending the city, major formations in the sector included the 54th Army, which was preparing for an offensive, and the 4th and 52d armies, subordinated to the Supreme High Command and defending the southward from Kirishi along the east bank of the Volkhov River. The 7th Separate Army, which was fighting hard battles against the Finnish Leningrad Army, was withdrawing its main forces to a line on the River Svir'.

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\* "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945), Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1961, p 89.

The enemy managed to cross the river and advance 8-15 km. After this the defensive front was permanently stabilized. It remained on this line until summer 1944.\*

In the days described here the General Staff did have a direct communication link with the Leningrad Front and all of the armies mentioned above. But wire communication with the staff of this front was extremely unstable, since the cable laid on the bottom of Lake Ladoga suffered considerable power leakage and was unable to insure uninterrupted operation of the Bodo telegraph apparatus link with Moscow. Because of frequent breaks in communication, the actions of the armies could be controlled from Moscow only if an intermediate post retransmitting operational information were to be organized somewhere south of Lake Ladoga.

During our discussion V. V. Kurasov noted that our mission was not only to organize retransmission of information from the staffs in question but also to determine the situation locally and transmit orders and instructions from the Supreme High Command General Headquarters to the staffs if direct communication with the General Staff is interrupted.

It did not take us long to assemble. On acquainting ourselves with the situation in the Leningrad sector we quickly selected the topographic maps and staff support materiel we needed.

Arriving in Volkhov on 30 September, we situated ourselves in a huge building in which the 54th Army Rear Services Directorate had also deployed itself. The latter was headed by the army's rear services chief, Major General A. V. Utkin. The headquarters of the Leningrad Front's air force operations group, commanded by Major General I. P. Zhuravlev and providing support to the 54th Army, was a few kilometers south of the city. I once again met him in 1944 on the Baltic coast, when Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General of Aviation I. P. Zhuravlev was commander of 14th Air Army, 3d Baltic Front, and I was this front's chief of the headquarters operational directorate.

In short time we established communication with the headquarters of the Leningrad Front with a Bodo telegraph apparatus. There were two such pieces of equipment in the instrument room of the communications center (one connecting to Moscow and the other connecting to Leningrad). Information was received from Leningrad and retransmitted without decoding directly to the General Staff and vice versa. Communication with the headquarters of the 4th, 52d, 54th, and 7th Separate armies was established with an ST-35 telegraph apparatus.

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\* Goretskov, K. A., "Na sluzhbe narodu" (In the Service of the People), Moscow, Politizdat, 1968, pp 224-225.

In addition to me, the operational post was staffed by General Staff officers Major Yanin, captains Zvezdin and I. F. Reshmin, and Senior Lieutenant P. F. Fhamov. They serviced the four army sectors while the author of the present article serviced the headquarters of the Leningrad Front. The work was hard, but we always helped each other along. We met once again after the war in the department of operational art of the Academy of the General Staff. The only one missing was Zvezdin, who after returning from Volkhov died in a battle on the Western Front. The telegraph shift workers, women predominantly, were well trained, since prior to the war they had worked in communication centers of the Peoples Commissariat of Communications. The General Staff operational post had its own radios, and it was afforded the use of the Leningrad Front's U-2 liaison airplanes.

Discussing the communication resources I should note that radio communication never developed to a great extent because our wire communication link, which made use of permanent transmission lines, was fully operable. Transmissions with the Bodo and the ST-35, and especially telephone conversation were less frequent. This was perhaps partially the product of the "radio-phobia" lingering from peacetime.

The operational post and its communication links were organized and our subsequent work in Volkhov proceeded without any great interference from enemy aviation, which concentrated its bombing effort within the city limits mainly on the rail bridge across the Volkhov River, trying to cut off the 54th Army's supplies at Voybukalo Station. To the credit of our anti-aircraft gunners, during our entire presence in the city enemy airplanes never did manage to make a direct hit on the bridge.

It should be noted that the operational post was not a substitute for the Leningrad sector command of the General Staff (the sector was headed by Colonel N. V. Postnikov, who was later promoted to major general), but being closer to the troops, it served as a back-up and supplemented its communications. Moreover, whenever interruptions occurred in communication with the General Staff, it was the sole source of information from particular armies. As I had pointed out earlier, wire communication was maintained with the headquarters of the Leningrad Front only through the operational post, and it operated stably. To clarify the situation locally or deliver orders from Moscow, our officers visited the different army headquarters both on their own initiative and on instructions from the General Staff. The headquarters of the armies named above were situated not far away from us, and therefore we usually traveled by motor vehicle, and more rarely aboard a U-2 airplane.

In the first days of October one of our officers, Captain I. F. Reshmin, had a curious experience in a visit to the southern group of the 7th Separate Army (group commander, General P. V. Tevetayev). Landing at an airfield near the village of Novinki (northeast of Lodeinaya Field) he was met by Captain S. P. Novikov, an air regiment commander, who at first would not accept the validity of Reshmin's identification as an officer of the General Staff, and he detained him, declaring that there were no

such officers in the Red Army. The matter was cleared up quickly, and he made his apologies. This incident showed that the required alertness was being displayed, but it also was an indication that the higher staff was uninformed of the control methods being employed.

It should be stated that the General Staff officer group had been created back in July 1941 on instructions of Supreme High Commander I. V. Stalin, who said that the officers of the General Staff were the eyes and ears of the General Staff. Later the group was reorganized as the General Staff liaison officer corps, which played a major role in control of the troops by the General Staff, particularly in monitoring and checking completion of missions in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

We had been in the Volkhov Construction Administration's building for a week when V. V. Kurasov was summoned back to the General Staff in connection with a new offensive started by the enemy's Army Group North on 30 September 1941 in the Leningrad sector, and leadership of the operational post fell upon me.

On 16 October the situation at the front southeast of Leningrad became much worse. On that day the enemy's 16th Army, which enjoyed considerable superiority, attacked the 4th and 52d armies, which occupied defenses in a zone 130 km wide and possessed only five rifle and one cavalry division. Breaking through their defenses by 20 October, the enemy began exploiting the breakthrough, making his main strike with XXXIX Mechanized Corps in the direction of Gruzino, Budogoshch', and Tikhvin. The remaining forces advanced toward Malaya Vishera.\*

Naturally the critical situation on the front had an immediate effect on the nature of the operational post's work: Its functions broadened, since we were now forced to assume one of the operational staff's responsibilities after another. This feature of our work is instructive, and I would like to discuss it in greater detail.

In the first days of the German offensive the most complex situation developed in the 4th Army, which bore the enemy's main thrust. The enemy cut its combat formations in two with a strike toward Budogoshch' and Tikhvin by the XXXIX Mechanized Corps. Command and control was disturbed in the army, and its troops began to withdraw in two diverging directions. Troops defending north of Gruzino retreated toward Volkhov along the Volkhov River, slowing down the enemy's onslaught. These troops were under the command of army chief of staff General P. I. Lyapin (this was referred to as the Volkhov group). The second part of the army, which suffered considerable losses, was quickly pushed back to Tikhvin by the German. This came to be called the Tikhvin group). This group was

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\* "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" (History of World War II 1939-1945), Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 112.

commanded by 4th Army Lieutenant General V. F. Yakovlev. He was accompanied by staff chief of operations Colonel I. P. Alferov and a small group of army staff officers.

Thus we found ourselves in the role of the binding link between these two groups. While performing its principal function, the operational post simultaneously organized mutual communication between Yakovlev and Lyapin. Communication was maintained mainly by high-frequency telephone, which saved time. Telegraph communication was maintained only with the 4th Army's Volkhov group.

The nature of communication with the Leningrad Front's air force operational group also broadened in the period under description here. In addition to receiving information from us on the situation, the Leningrad Front's air force commanders queried the operational post many times for information on targets within the zone of retreat of the 4th Army, which were subsequently attacked by our aviation. This target information was given to us by generals Yakovlev and Lyapin, with whom our airmen did not have stable communication; to the credit of our signalmen, on the other hand, we maintained around-the-clock communication with them.

There is another interesting aspect of the work of the operational post. Several days after the enemy's 16th Army began its offensive, our reconnaissance aviation discovered several columns of infantry marching northeast from the Volkhov River. The headquarters of the Leningrad Front's air force operational group, which was not exactly sure whether these were enemy or friendly troops, asked us. General Lyapin reported that these were columns of our military construction detachments withdrawing from the Volkhov River, where they had been building defenses. Thus a tragic error was averted. That such a mistake could be made might appear strange now, but the war had only begun then, the situation was complex, and we were still acquiring experience.

In November the enemy captured Tikhvin and reached the city of Volkhov, cutting the sole railroad by which Leningrad was supplied through a transshipment point on Lake Ladoga. Encirclement of the 7th Separate Army and the 54th Army became possible with the fall of Tikhvin. It was now clear that the Germans intended to achieve a complete blockade of Leningrad and troops of the Leningrad Front.

Chief of General Staff Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov telephoned the operational post in the evening of 7 November 1941 and requested us to transmit instructions from the Supreme High Command General Headquarters to Army General K. A. Meretakov ordering him to travel to the Tikhvin area and assume command of 4th Army troops that had withdrawn there, and of approaching reserves, to halt the enemy's advance north and east of Tikhvin, and to subsequently destroy the enemy's Tikhvin grouping.





I immediately telephoned the village of Alekhovshchina, the headquarters of the 7th Separate Army, and transmitted the instructions to K. A. Meretskov, adding that the Headquarters directives were being transmitted by scrambled communication channels. In literally just a few hours K. A. Meretskov submitted a report, to be relayed to the General Staff, that he was leaving for Sarozha (22 km north of Tikhvin) together with a group of

officers, and that he was in the process of fulfilling the staff orders. A tank brigade, a rifle regiment, and several mortar battalions and combat engineers were being transferred to Tikhvin from the 7th Separate Army;\* command of the 7th Separate Army was assigned to one of his deputies, Lieutenant General F. D. Gore'enko. General Meretskov retained overall leadership of its troops.

By this time the operational post had basically completed its mission, and on the night of 7 November Colonel M. V. Postnikov relayed to me an order from the chief of the General Staff to pack up the communication center on 8 November and move the entire staff of the operational post to Alekhovshchina, the headquarters of the 7th Separate Army. The personnel and materiel of the communication center were to be transferred to the latter, and the General Staff officers and I were to return to Moscow. In December 1941, when the field directorate of the Volkhov Front was formed, the operational post's communication resources served as the foundation of the staff communication center of this front.

The operational post justified its existence in the memorable days of Leningrad's heroic defense. It would be pertinent to recall that the Volkhov Front, which united the 4th, 52d, 59th, and 2d Strike armies, the first two of which had been serviced by the General Staff's Volkhov operational post, was formed southeast of Leningrad on 17 December 1941. Moreover the personnel of our operational post's communication center were well familiar with the equipment available in the area, with the communication lines servicing the Peoples Commissariat of Communications, and with other features.

In subsequent years of the war General Staff operational posts similar to the Volkhov post--that is, ones having the main mission of collecting and transmitting information for the General Staff, were never formed again.

The operational group of General Staff officers commanded by General Staff Marshal A. M. Vasilievskiy performed other tasks during his visits to the operational army as liaison officer of the Supreme High Command General Headquarters: The group's mission was to coordinate the combat efforts of several fronts.

This group also had its own communication center, motor vehicles, and airplanes. In addition to collecting data on the situation and maintaining an operational map of a particular sector of the Soviet-German front, it had to monitor execution of orders issued by the Supreme High Command General Headquarters and the General Staff, and work up various documents pertaining to the work of General Headquarters liaison officers. This group was headed by Lieutenant General M. M. Potapov, and it was staffed by 10

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\* Meretskov, K. A., "Na sluzhbe narodu," p 231.

persons. It could be said that in terms of the functions it performed, this was a miniature headquarters.

As we can see, auxiliary control elements (operational posts, operational groups) did not play a large part at the strategic level, being necessary only in unusual situations. But the missions they performed were extremely important. For comparison we can note that auxiliary control elements taking the form of army auxiliary control posts and frontal auxiliary control posts enjoyed rather broad application in the past war at the operational level.

It is important today to make creative use of the rich and instructive experience accumulated by auxiliary control elements in the course of the Great Patriotic War to improve management of the troops in the preparation and conduct of both defensive and offensive operations.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION FROM 1939-1940 PUBLISHED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 47-49

[Excerpts of orders published under the heading "Documents and Materials":  
"Control Elements of Soviet Troops During the Period of Military Operations  
at Khalkhin-Gol (1939)"]

[Text] In mid-1939 the Soviet troops in the Far East consisted of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army (commander, Army Commander 2d Rank G. M. Shtern), the 2d Separate Red Banner Army (commander, Corps Commander I. S. Konev), and the Transbaykal Military District (commander, Corps Commander F. N. Remizov). These major formations were subordinated directly to the USSR Commissar of Defense. In operational respects the 1st Separate Red Banner Army was subordinated to the Pacific Fleet, the 2d Separate Red Banner Army was subordinated to the Red Banner Amur Flotilla,\* and the Transbaykal Military District was subordinated to the LVII Special Corps, which was deployed in the Mongolian Peoples Republic.\*\*

After the treacherous attack on Mongolia by Japanese invaders in May 1939 the Soviet government took steps to strengthen its leadership of the troops in the area where the combat activities were developing. In the first days of June Division Commander G. K. Zhukov, the Belorussian Military District deputy troop commander for cavalry, was sent there with the task of analyzing the situation, implementing whatever immediate measures were required, and submitting his proposals. Estimating the situation as a whole, he came "to the conclusion that it would be impossible to halt Japan's military intervention with the forces our LVII Special Corps had in Mongolia...."\*\*\* The Soviet Main Command immediately decided to reinforce the corps. G. K. Zhukov was

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- \* The Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla were subordinated to the commanders of the indicated armies (in operational respects) in response to an order of the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Defense dated 4 September 1938 (TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], f. 4, op. 11, d. 54, ll 237-239).
  - \*\* "Zabaykal'skiy voyennyi okrug" (The Transbaykal Military District), Irkutsk, 1972, p 75.
  - \*\*\* Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" (Recollections and Deliberations), Vol 1, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1978, p 152.

appointed its commander, and under his guidance Soviet and Mongolian troops dealt a serious blow to the enemy at the start of July 1939.

However, the Japanese militarists continued to augment their forces in this area for the purposes of even broader aggression. This course of events made it necessary for the Soviet command to alter the organizational structure of troop command in the Far Eastern theater of war, and to concurrently increase their strength.

On 5 July the main military council of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] decided to form a new element of strategic armed forces command in Chita, subordinating all troops deployed at that time in the Far East to it. In correspondence with this decision the Peoples Commissar of Defense published an order creating the Frontal Troop Group (Document No 1) under the command of Army Commander 2d Rank G. M. Shtern. The military council and staff of the created group were given the missions of uniting and directing the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, managing their operations and their logistical support in both peacetime and wartime, and so on (Document No 2). The commander of the Front Troop Group was subordinated directly to the USSR Peoples Commissar of Defense. The improvements made on troop command and control elements in the Far Eastern theater of war culminated with reorganization of the LVII Special Corps, deployed in Mongolia, as the 1st Army Group under the command of Division Commander G. K. Zhukov, and its subordination directly to the commander of the Frontal Troop Group in the Far East (Document No 3).

This reorganization of the command and control elements of the Soviet troops in the Far East promoted successful completion of the missions of destroying Japanese troops in the vicinity of Khalkin-Gol and foiling the aggressive intentions of imperialist Japan against the USSR and the Mongolian Peoples Republic. The newly created directorates of the Frontal and Army troop groups continued to function for almost another year following termination of military actions (Document No 4).

The experience of improving the command elements of the Soviet troops in the Far East was broadly employed in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

#### No 1

From an Order of the USSR Peoples Commissar of Defense, 5 July 1939

In execution of the 5 July 1939 decision of the RKKA Main Military Council to combine and direct the actions of the 1st and 2d Red Banner armies, the Transbaykal Military District, and the LVII Special Corps, the Frontal Group to be formed and deployed in the city of Chita.

1. Army Commander 2d Rank Comrade G. M. Shtern, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, is hereby released from the post he presently occupies and is appointed commander of the Frontal Group.



2. Comrade M. M. Popov, chief of staff of the 1st Red Banner Army, is appointed commander of that army.

Orders follow:

1. Frontal Group commander Comrade B. M. Batern is to immediately leave for Chita and begin performing his responsibilities.
2. RKKA Chief of General Staff Comrade B. M. Shaposhnikov is to work out, and submit for approval, the tables of organization and the deployment positions of the Frontal Group as of 8 July 1939.
3. Deputy peoples commissars of defense comrades Sachadenko and Mekhlis are to select, and submit for my approval, personnel for the Frontal Group within 5 days....

Peoples Commissar of Defense, Marshal  
of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

TsGASA, f. 4, sp. 15, d. 1, l. 1. Original

Sec 2

From an Interim Statute on the Organization and Control of the Frontal Group  
(in Peacetime), Approved by USSR Peoples Commissar of Defense  
Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov on 9 July 1939

The Frontal Group is formed for the purposes of combining and directing the actions of the 1st and 2d Red Banner Armies, the Transbaykal Military District, and the LVII Special Corps.

The Frontal Group is headed by the commander of the Frontal Group and the military commissar, to whom all troop formations and units within its composition are subordinated.

The commander of the Frontal Group is directly subordinated to the Peoples Commissar of Defense.

The Frontal Group commander's duties are:

1. Combination and direction of the actions of 1st and 2d Red Banner armies, the Transbaykal Military District, and the LVII Special Corps.
2. Management of the operational activities of the troops within the composition of the Frontal Group, and of preparations of the theater of war....
3. Control over the combat, political, and operational training of troops within the composition of the Frontal Group.
4. Control over the mobilizational preparedness of troops of the Frontal Group, and of their logistical support in peacetime and in wartime.

All orders to the troops of the Frontal Group are to be signed by the commander of the Frontal Group, the military commissar, and the chief of staff.

#### The Frontal Group Staff

The group staff is the control element of the Frontal Group's commander. The group chief of staff is concurrently the group deputy commander.

The duties of the Frontal Group chief of staff:

1. To develop proposals and a plan for operational use of the troops of the Frontal Group.
2. To study the enemy's armed forces and the theater of war.
3. To develop a plan for organizing the rear and providing logistical support to troops of the Frontal Group in wartime.
4. To develop proposals for and to monitor operational preparation of the theater of war....

Chief of General Staff, Army  
Commander 1st Rank  
B. Shaposhnikov

Acting Military Commissar of the  
RKKA General Staff, Colonel Gusev

Acting Commander, 4th Section,  
Colonel Chetverikov

USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives, f. 15-A, op. 2138, d. 1, ll. 1-10.  
Original

#### No 3

From an Order of the Peoples Commissar of Defense Dated 19 July 1939

In execution of a decision of the RKKA Main Military Council to reinforce management of troops located on the territory of the Mongolian Peoples Republic, the administration of the LVII Special Corps is to be reorganized as the administration of the Army Group and subordinated to the commander of the Frontal Group.

The formed army group is to be named the "1st Army Group."

Division commander Comrade Zhukov is appointed commander of the 1st Army Group and Brigade Commissar Comrade Nikishev is appointed member of the military council.

The RKKA Chief of General Staff is to work up the tables of organization and the deployment of the administration of the 1st Army Group with a consideration for the unique features of its activity, and to submit them to me for approval....

Peoples Commissar of Defense, Marshal  
of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

TsGASA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 90, l. 35. Original

#### No 4

From an Order of the USSR Peoples Commissar of Defense Dated 21 June 1940

The group administration of the Far East and the Transbaykal Military District are to be reorganized as of 1 July 1940.

1. The following are to be formed:
  - a) The administration of the Far Eastern Front... naval detachments.
  3. The 1st Army Group is to be renamed the 17th Army.
  4. The following are to be subordinated to the military council of the Far Eastern Front...
    - f) The Pacific Fleet and the Amur and Banner Fleets--only in operational respects....
  6. The following are to be disbanded:
    - a) The administration of the Frontal (Group) Group. The personnel are to be transferred to the administration of the Far Eastern Front....

Peoples Commissar of Defense, Marshal  
of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko

TsGASA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 91, ll. 38-40. Original

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CSO: 5143/0037

## EVENTS OF IASI-KISHINEV OPERATION RECOUNTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 50-53

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials": "On the 35th Anniversary of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation"]

[Text] Thirty years ago, between 20 and 29 August 1944 troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts successfully completed the Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla. This was one of the largest operations of the past war, and the most outstanding in terms of strategic and military-political significance. In extremely short time Soviet troops encircled and defeated the main forces of the opposing fascist German Army South Ukraine and liberated the Moldavian SSR and Izmail'skaya Oblast from the invaders. Monarchical Romania dropped out of the fascist bloc and declared war on Nazi Germany.

Influenced by the Soviet Army's brilliant victories, Romania's democratic forces under the guidance of the Communist Party toppled Antonescu's fascist regime and formed a new government.

"The day of 23 August 1944," wrote G. Gheorghiu-Dej, general secretary of the Romanian Workers Party Central Committee, "was the day of Romania's liberation by the victorious Soviet Army, and of the overthrow of Antonescu's dictatorship by patriotic forces led by the Romanian Communist Party, and it has become a great national holiday for the Romanian people. Liberation of our country by the Soviet Army opened the way of the laborers for creating a democratic, free, and independent Romania."<sup>1</sup> On 24 August Romania quit the war on the side of fascist Germany.

An address published by the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee on the same day stated: "We rely in our struggle of liberation on the active support of the Allied powers, and mainly on assistance from the USSR and its heroic Red Army, which is pursuing and crushing the hordes of German invaders on our soil...."<sup>2</sup>

On the night of 25 August the Romanian government received a message from the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs stating: "In connection

with the events in Romania, the Soviet government does not feel it expedient to confirm its declaration, given in April of this year, that the Soviet Union has no intention of acquiring any part of Romanian territory or altering the existing political structure in Romania.... On the contrary, the Soviet government feels it necessary to restore, together with the Romanians, the independence of Romania by liberating Romania from the fascist German yoke.... Assistance to Romanian troops by troops of the Red Army in liberating the German troops is the sole means of quick termination of military actions on the territory of Romania and of arriving at a peace settlement between Romania and the Allies.<sup>2</sup>

The plans of Anglo-American imperialists to seize the Balkan countries, to include Romania, and establish a regime there advantageous to the former suffered failure as a result of the Soviet Army's successful offensive.

Destruction of enemy defenses on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front created favorable conditions for troops for a swift offensive deep into Romania and into the Carpathian Basin, and for provision of assistance to the Romanian, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Hungarian, and Czech peoples in their liberation. The blockade in the Black Sea improved significantly and our Black Sea Fleet could now conduct combat activities successfully. After Romania dropped out of Hitler's coalition, the enemy was deprived of his most important sources of strategic raw materials and food.

The Iasi-Kishinev operation also had tremendous significance from the standpoint of the art of war. It entered history as a remarkable example of swift--and, moreover, strictly planned--encirclement and annihilation of a large enemy grouping in mountainous forested terrain containing strong fortified areas.

In 10 days the Soviet troops annihilated 32 German divisions, 18 of which had been encircled, and 208,600 enlisted men and officers were captured. Four hundred ninety tanks and assault guns, 1,500 guns, 298 airplanes, and 15,000 motor vehicles were annihilated, and a tremendous quantity of various combat equipment and armament was captured.<sup>3</sup>

The operation was typified by great scope. There were 1,250,000 men, 16,000 guns and mortars, 1,870 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,200 warplanes in both fronts.<sup>4</sup> The offensive began on a front of 540 km, and it developed to a depth of 300 km in 10 days at a rate of 30 km per day. At the beginning of the operation the enemy grouping consisted of 900,000 enlisted men and officers, 7,600 guns and mortars, 404 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 810 warplanes.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to other encirclement operations, in the Iasi-Kishinev operation each of the fronts began with one but an extremely powerful thrust. Auxiliary thrusts were made only after defenses were penetrated on the



main axis, utilizing the already-formed breach to broaden the front of the offensive.

The clear organization of interaction between the 3d Ukrainian Front, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Danube Naval Flotilla deserves attention. The last two helped troops of the 46th Army to cross the Dniester River valley and to encircle the Romanian 3d Army in the vicinity of Akkerman.

The night crossing of as broad a water obstacle as the Dniester River drowned valley (11 km wide) by troops of the 46th Army in interaction with the Black Sea Fleet was unprecedented.

Another unique feature of the operation was the rare case in which just one of our armies (the 6th Army) surrounded an enemy army (the Romanian Army, and subsequently defeated it.

Clear distribution of the manpower and resources between the inner and outer fronts of encirclement had great significance. In this case the smaller proportion of the men and equipment of the fronts (about 45 percent) was allocated to the inner front, though it was sufficient to annihilate the encircled enemy. The bulk of the forces (to include mobile troops) were immediately reorganized to exploit the offensive in depth with the goal of seizing the so-called "Fokshanskiy Gates" and advancing deep into Romania.

Operational camouflage and deception played an important role. In the 2d Ukrainian Front it involved false concentration of men and equipment on the flanks, and in the 3d Ukrainian Front this deception was performed on the Kishinev axis within the zone of the 5th Strike Army, while the main thrust was made much further south, from the Tiraspol' bridgehead. Surprise was achieved as a result, especially in the 3d Ukrainian Front. It was not until the third day of the operation that the enemy began withdrawing his army (the 6th Army) from the Kishinev salient, but our mechanized corps had already cut off its retreat.

The liquidation of the encircled enemy is of practical interest. What was unique about it on the east bank of the Prut was that the VII and IV Guards Mechanized corps of the 3d Ukrainian Front, which reached the Prut on the fourth day, deployed with their front facing the northeast along the route of withdrawal of the enemy's Kishinev grouping, and went over to the defensive. Advancing from the front, the combined arms armies (5th Strike, 37th, and 37th) made powerful thrusts on converging axes, pushing the enemy into the defenses of the mechanized corps. Thus the mobile formations were a unique "anvil," and the combined arms armies were the "hammer."

Little is said of the enemy on the west bank of the Prut was unique in that the 52d Army, 2d Ukrainian Front had to operate in the difficult conditions of a marshy forest, with individual units and formations fighting on separated axes, often on a reversed front--that is, enemy attacks had to be repelled at different times from both directions.

There were also unique features in the use of artillery. Thus artillery was grouped for the first time not with respect to type of weapons but rather on the basis of an organizational-tactical principle. False transfer of fire deep into the defenses was employed successfully in the course of artillery preparation, and artillery screens across the enemy's routes of retreat operated effectively.

There were also unique features in the use of the 6th Tank Army, 2d Ukrainian Front. Possessing 500 combat vehicles, it was cast into the breach of the second line of defense as early as in the middle of the first day of the offensive, which was a rare phenomenon in the past war. Moreover it operated in a unique sort of "armored" corridor between General S. I. Gorshkov's mechanized cavalry group and the XVIII Tank Corps. As a result the 6th Tank Army did not have to commit forces to the support of its flank. It directed all of its striking power toward capturing the "Fokshanskiy Gates" and quickly advancing deep into Romanian territory.

Engineering support to the operation was instructive. It involved, first of all, erection of submerged bridges across the rivers Prut, Iput, and Siret. According to an evaluation made by the commander of the 2d Ukrainian Front, such bridges had "recommended themselves well, especially on turbid rivers. Enemy aviation was unable to detect such bridges."<sup>7</sup> Moreover broad use was made of mobile obstacle detachments at the divisional and frontal levels to liquidate the enemy's encircled Kishinev grouping and to strengthen threatened sectors.

One of the distinguishing traits of aviation's use was that more than 70 percent of all sorties were flown in behalf of ground troops encircling and annihilating the enemy. Moreover for the first time in the course of the war ground attack aircraft of both fronts made aerial photographic surveys of travel routes and crossings to a depth of 80 km. The air scouts photographed an area of 134,313 square kilometers. This had important significance to more-precise evaluation of the situation, to adoption of correct decisions, and on the whole to the operation's successful progress.

Much attention was devoted to party-political work among the personnel during preparation for and in the course of the Iasi-Kishinev operation. The main efforts were directed in this case at creating a high offensive spirit in the troops and at resolutely surmounting difficulties associated with penetrating strong enemy defenses in the complex conditions afforded by highly broken terrain, and with the conduct of combat actions on the territory of a state possessing an army fighting together with fascist German troops against the USSR. One extremely important measure was that of reinforcing the party and Komsomol organizations in the troops before the beginning of the offensive, since many communists and Komsomol members had been lost in the course of the winter and spring offensives. The political agencies had to exert considerable effort to restore and

cement the grass-roots party units. By the beginning of the offensive the proportion of party and Komsomol members attained 50 percent and more in many rifle companies.

Much work was done among the personnel to explain the essence of the Soviet Army's international mission of liberation to the troops, and to impress the need for establishing friendly mutual relationships between Soviet soldiers and the Romanian public.

The military commands of the fronts and armies, the commanders and political agencies, and the party and Komsomol organizations tried to see that all enlisted men and officers would recognize the unique features of the new situation in which they were to operate, understand the nature of the new combat missions and the methods of their execution, and carry the honor and merit of the Soviet soldier of liberation high. Party-political work corresponded fully to the new missions of combat activities on the territories of other countries.

The humanitarian relationship of our soldiers towards the Romanian public strengthened the sympathies between the people of Romania and the Soviet Army. The laborers met our soldiers of liberation warmly, being persuaded of the truly friendly goals pursued by our troops in Romania.

War documents contain a tremendous quantity of examples of the gratefulness expressed by Romanian citizens for their liberation from fascist oppression. Let me cite just the statements of two persons from the village of Koneleu. Peasant Ion Lazylaki declared: "The coming of the Red Army was feared only by those who believed German propaganda, while we, the old people, who had fought side by side with the Russians against the Germans in 1916, were not afraid of the Russians. We know that the Russians are our friends. They also helped us to gain independence in 1877." Mina Ungurenu, a priest: "I have now become convinced that the Red Army does behave itself well, and I am quite ready to cross the front line and tell all Romanians, soldiers and civilians alike, that they have nothing to fear from the Red Army."<sup>8</sup>

On 11 August the Soviet Army entered Bucharest, Romania's capital. Giant self-propelled guns, heavy tanks, dusty armored transporters, and motor-cycles poured into the broad streets of the Romanian capital, and a tremendous quantity of Soviet airplanes escorting the ground troops flew over the capital.

Great was the joy of the residents of the Romanian capital in these days. They frantically met the Soviet soldiers of liberation. Slogans were being shouted everywhere: "Traia Armata Roshchi!" ("Long Live the Red Army!"). Women were adorned with flowers and greeted with avid applause. The people of Bucharest viewed the mighty current of Soviet troops as the savior of the country of the Romanian people and as a realistic force that would be capable of expelling the fascist German invaders from their motherland.

Soviet soldiers displayed a high offensive spirit in the battles for liberation of Romania. Moving deep into the country, our formations established contacts and organized cooperation with Romanian units and formations that had turned their arms against the Germans.

Performing their mission of liberation in Romania, Soviet troops displayed high proficiency and heroism. Just in August-October 1944 alone more than 50,000 enlisted men and officers were awarded orders and medals for battle heroism. More than 150 units and formations received honorary titles. The liberation of Romania was achieved at the price of great sacrifices. More than 280,000 Soviet soldiers shed their blood on Romanian soil, 69,000 of them dying. The losses of the Romanian troops in the struggle against the Germans from 23 August to 30 October were more than 58,300 men killed, wounded, and missing in action.<sup>9</sup>

"The Romanian people," emphasizes a message of greetings from the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee and the Romanian government on the event of the 30th anniversary of the victory over fascism, "are deeply grateful to the Soviet people and their glorious armed forces, which...made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany and rendered invaluable assistance to the liberation of Romania and other countries and peoples from Nazi dominance."<sup>10</sup>

During the struggle against the Germans in Romania the Soviet and Romanian troops underwent their first test as a joint fighting unit and passed it successfully; the friendship of the peoples of the USSR and Romania was strengthened by jointly shed blood.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 8 May 1951.
2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" (History of World War II 1939-1945), Vol 9, Voenizdat, 1978, p 113.
3. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz v period Otechestvennoy voyny" (The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Patriotic War), Vol 2, Izd-vo Politicheskoy literatury, 1946, p 172.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," Vol 9, pp 108-109.
5. Ibid., p 104.
6. Ibid.
7. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1959, p 28.
8. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1967, p 54.

9. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," Vol 9, p 118.
10. Ibid.

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## SOVIET CRITICISM OF CHINESE ATTACK ON VIETNAM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 54-61

[Article, published under the heading "Against the Maoist Falsifiers of History," by Merinov, Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Science, MAJ Gen. M. Monin: "The Hegemonic and Adventuristic Policy of the Maoists in Operation (From the History of Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam)"]

[Text] On 17 February China began an undeclared war of aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which lasted 30 days. This event persuasively demonstrated that the Maoists have once and for all dropped to proimperialist, expansionist, and antisocialist foreign policy, and that they have begun openly acting in unity with the capitalist world.

For a number of years the leaders of the People's Republic of China, creating an excessively great military potential, have intensively sought allies among the most reactionary forces of the imperialist countries, ones which might support Beijing's military adventurers in both the material and the political aspects. Hopes were laid on Japan, the USA, and some European NATO countries. In August 1978 a treaty of peace and friendship having an openly anti-Soviet orientation was signed between the PRC and Japan.

China and the USA have grown noticeably closer together on the soil of the common anti-Soviet leanings of Beijing and Washington. Moreover both sides displayed a mutual interest in such an improvement of relations. It was at the very beginning of 1979 that normal diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries, which had been hostile to one another for such a long time.

The PRC's treaties with Japan and the USA quite clearly revealed the strategic line of Chinese hegemonists and chauvinists at forming a bloc with the main forces of international imperialism. Moreover, as was written in KOMMUNIST, "China's union with world capitalism now extends not only to politics, where Beijing is transforming into imperialism's apprentice in its struggle against socialism, but also to the military area."<sup>1</sup>

China hastened to demonstrate to the West that it was in fact serious in its intentions to fight against world socialism with all resources, including military. The Maoists decided to make their first strike against socialist Vietnam. The reasons behind this choice are as follows.

First, the arising of a strong, unified socialist Vietnam, standing firmly in its implementation of domestic and foreign policy on the positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is a serious obstacle to China's expansionist plans in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam and all of Indochina are China's gate to Southeast Asia. It was this gate that Beijing decided to break down by crushing the main forces of the Vietnamese People's Army and annexing Vietnam. An address of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee to the Vietnamese in connection with China's aggression stated the following in this regard: "Reactionary Beijing rulers, who came to an agreement with U.S. imperialists long ago, schemed to annex our country in the desire to achieve their Great Power expansionist goals."<sup>2</sup> At the same time the Maoists counted on forcing people's democratic Laos and people's Cambodia to their knees.

Second, Vietnam also incites anger in Beijing because through its historic victory over Japanese, French, and especially American invaders and its successes in building socialism and strengthening its national independence and sovereignty, it has earned a tremendous amount of authority in the world, mainly among the peoples of Southeast Asia, infusing them with new confidence that even the strongest invaders could be conquered and that independence could be defended. Beijing wanted to do away with socialist Vietnam's authority and force of inspiration once and forever.

Third, by defeating Vietnam China hoped to undermine the unity and friendship between the USSR and the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam], which is based on the commonness of their goals and objectives and the unity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, and which is a powerful and irreplaceable source of SRV's successful forward progress in solution of the fundamental problems of its domestic and foreign policy, to include those of strengthening its defense capabilities and stabilizing the situation in all of Indochina. The Soviet-Vietnamese 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Moscow in November 1978 was met in Beijing with unconcealed malice and irritation, inasmuch as it was a confirmation of the USSR's and SRV's point of view that "rendering assistance to each other in consolidating and defending socialist achievements attained at the cost of the heroic efforts and selfless labor of their peoples is viewed by the two sides as their international duty."<sup>3</sup> As L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "The goal of the treaty is to make the fraternal friendship between the peoples of our countries even stronger and deeper. Acting together, we become stronger in politics, in economics, and in other spheres of social life."<sup>4</sup> It is no accident that after this document was signed, in its effort to earn the favor of the West Beijing began to shout even louder than before about the nonexistent Soviet threat in Asia.

Undertaking an armed attack against the SRV, Beijing leaders intended to force Vietnam to abandon its union with the USSR, to break the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and to become a puppet in the hands of Chinese hegemonists.

Fourth, Beijing's organizers of the aggression against the SRV hoped to force Vietnam to abandon all aid to people's Cambodia. They wanted to restore in Phnom Penh the pro-Chinese clique of (Pol Pot) and (Iyeng Sari), which had been overturned by the Cambodian people and which Beijing is still supplying with arms to fight against the legal revolutionary government. Concurrently with this, Beijing supposed that a strike against Vietnam and a consequent rejection of support to people's Cambodia would serve as an unambiguous warning to all neighbors in Southeast Asia that China will continue to pursue its goals in similar fashion, stopping at nothing to establish an order advantageous to it in countries contiguous with the PRC.

Fifth, by the treacherous invasion of Vietnam with their troops, the rulers of Beijing hoped to test the combat skills of their troops in direct military actions. The Maoists hoped to use military actions in Vietnam, which the people were led to believe had been started by the Vietnamese side, to alleviate the displeasure of the laborers with failures in the country's economic development and its burdensome material position.

And sixth and finally, by their actions against the SRV Beijing Maoists wanted to deal a blow against the peaceful aspirations of the USSR and all countries of the socialist fraternity, and to mobilize all reactionary forces of the world for the purposes of intensifying countermeasures against relaxation of tension and for fighting for a return of the "cold war," for unrestrained acceleration of the arms race.

Chinese aggression against Vietnam did not begin suddenly, and it did not begin as a "retaliatory measure" against "Vietnamese provocations," which is what Beijing propaganda stubbornly insisted. Both political and military preparations were made beforehand for this aggression in Beijing, and measures for destabilizing the situation in the SRV were planned.

There are many concrete facts indicating that Beijing did not at all want the Vietnamese people to win over the foreign invaders and their South Vietnamese servants. Citing data it acquired from authoritative Vietnamese sources, the American communist newspaper DAILY WORLD reported that China had argued against creating a united Vietnam as early as in 1954, during a Geneva conference in which the Indochina question was discussed. Since that time, while paying lip service in support of the struggle of liberation of the Vietnamese people against American interventionists and even rendering some material assistance to them, Beijing did everything to keep a unified, socialist Vietnam from coming into being. The Chinese leadership wanted the war in Vietnam to drag on as long as possible--that is, "until the last Vietnamese," so as to help the USA to save Thieu's Saigon regime because, according to the DAILY WORLD, creation of a unified

independent Vietnam would be a heavy blow to Mao's expansionist plans in Southeast Asia.<sup>6</sup>

In order to hinder Vietnam's unification and stabilization, as early as in spring 1975 Beijing began a so-called "small war" against Vietnam using foreign hands for this purpose--the forces of Pol Pot's Cambodia. Minor strikes by Pol Pot's troops against Vietnamese border regions subsequently escalated into a true war of attrition against the SRV, one making use of artillery and aviation. Overall leadership to the provocations was provided by 20,000 Chinese advisors. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese peaceful residents in the republic's border regions died in 3.5 years of this undeclared war. Pol Pot declared that each Cambodian could kill 30 Vietnamese before being killed himself, and consequently 2 million Cambodians could be sacrificed to annihilate all Vietnamese.<sup>7</sup>

However, Beijing's plans for exhausting the SRV and forcing it to alter its positions in relation to the principal issues of its political orientation by means of a "small war" out of Cambodia suffered failure. The revolutionary-patriotic forces of Cambodia, which joined together in the United Front of Peoples Socialist Cambodia, defeated the reactionary regime of Pol Pot and Iyeng Sari, a regime which had gained the contempt of the entire world for mass genocide of its own people. Consumed with rage, Beijing accelerated its preparations for direct aggression against the SRV by Chinese troops.

First began a campaign of mass flight, meticulously organized by Beijing, of citizens of Chinese nationality (huajiao) from the SRV to China. At a time when the rulers of the SRV were taking steps to restrict bourgeois elements to the south of the country, a significant proportion of which consisted of huajiao, Beijing hypocritically accused the SRV of unlawfully persecuting persons of Chinese nationality. With the help of its agents, Beijing managed to cause more than 150,000 huajiao to flee to China by the end of July 1978, which created serious difficulties in the work of many of the SRV's enterprises and institutions. Concurrently the PRC refused to provide technical assistance to the SRV in construction of various facilities. A most unbridled propaganda campaign was waged against Vietnam with the goal of inciting an explosion of nationalism and chauvinism among the Chinese people and raising their hatred of the Vietnamese.

By mid-February 1979 China had concentrated, according to official Vietnamese data, several army corps with a total strength of up to 600,000 men, many tanks, and aviation along the SRV border under the cover of an anti-Vietnamese propaganda storm.

Not long before the aggression against the SRV Deng Xiaoping made an official visit to the USA, and on his way back from Washington to Beijing he visited Tokyo. He informed the governments of the USA and Japan of China's forthcoming attack on Vietnam, and he received actual approval of this step from them. THE NEW YORK POST for example, wrote directly: "The accusation that the White House is encouraging Chinese aggression is fully grounded."<sup>8</sup>

Even without this, both capitals were aware of the preparations for the attack, and of concentration of tremendous masses of Chinese troops on the Vietnamese border. This was reported in all of the world's press, and perhaps to a greater extent in the American and Japanese press. Moreover, American reconnaissance satellites had photographed the entire Chinese grouping on the borders of Vietnam, and its strength had been counted. A week prior to the Chinese invasion THE NEW YORK TIMES reported that there were two Chinese armies consisting of select divisions on the borders of Vietnam.

And it was not until Beijing enlisted the consent of its new friends in Washington and Tokyo that it gave the order for the troops to begin their invasion.

The design of the Chinese command was to penetrate deeply into Vietnam and destroy the opposing enemy in a few days by means of a massed strike by Chinese troops on several axes along the entire China-Vietnam border, no matter what the losses. In short, it had planned a blitzkrieg.

China's aggression did not catch the Vietnamese people unawares. They met the enemy with everything they had. Responding to the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam to the people, all patriots capable of bearing arms in the six northern provinces--Quang Ninh, Cao Bang, (Khatuyen), and others--joined the struggle with weapons in hand together with frontier and territorial units. The battles went on day and night. Despite the fact that the command of the Vietnamese People's Army did not commit the major forces of its regular troops to the combat actions until practically the end of the war, the Chinese aggressors encountered the most decisive resistance of the frontier troops, territorial defense troops, and the civilian public. Practically all people in the combat zone rose to defend the motherland. This also explained the insuperable power of socialist Vietnam when the enemy had attacked the country before. This power came into being once again in the war against the Chinese aggressors. The Vietnamese people steadfastly and courageously defended their revolutionary achievements. The fact that the Chinese aggressors were being battled in regions where almost a millenium earlier the Vietnamese had destroyed invaders from the north inspired them to heroism as well.

The aggressor intended to capture, within the first 4 hours, three important provincial centers--Lang Son, Cao Bang, and Lao Cai, but his plans failed. Vietnamese soldiers defended them courageously. They understood that each of these centers, especially Lang Son, which was 141 km away from Hanoi, had important significance to the entire course of the battles, and that their capture by the enemy would permit the latter to penetrate deeply into Vietnamese territory.

The Chinese command tried to make broad use of artillery, including long-range artillery. Tanks were also employed, though the mountainous terrain



limited their maneuverability. During the battles, the Western press reports, the Chinese commanders revealed their inability to use tanks in close interaction with infantry. The combat vehicles often broke contact with infantry, which made it possible for the Vietnamese to inflict tangible losses upon the one and the other. The proficiency of the infantry was found to be clearly deficient as well: As a rule it attacked in "waves," trying to crush the enemy not by skill but by numbers, or by a "sea of people" rolling forward wave after wave, with no regard for losses.

Moreover the commanders did not trust their soldiers. This is why machine-guns were set up behind the combat formations to fire upon each line of attackers in the event that they dared to retreat. Subunits formed out of huajiao (Chinese who had fled to China from the SRV) operated among the Chinese troops. They often served as guides, since they knew the terrain.

Foreign observers noted that incompetent command was typical of not only the very lowest levels of command and control, but also the highest. Poor organization of interaction between formations was noted in particular.

Thirty days of war did not bring military success to China. Beijing leaders clearly were unable to "teach Vietnam a lesson," as they had vowed they would prior to the aggression. Having advanced a little more than 40 kilometers on one of the axes, much less on others, and having encountered growing resistance by the heroic soldiers of Vietnam, China was forced to halt and agree to withdraw its troops to the historically evolved borders between the PRC and the SRV.

The the American newspaper WALL STREET JOURNAL noted critically in its article "Who Taught Whom A Lesson?" that "if we weigh all of the pluses and minuses of China's 'punitive' invasion of Vietnam, the rest of mankind might agree that China emerged from this war with a soiled reputation and a broken nose."<sup>10</sup>

Not once did the stated confidence of Chinese leaders in the idea that Chinese troops would be able to dispell the myth of Vietnamese invincibility ever justify itself. Even expressed proponents of China's aggression recognized Beijing's failure. As an example the English newspaper GUARDIAN wrote that "the Vietnamese doubtlessly came out on top in the military aspect. Dung declared that this operation would show that Vietnamese invincibility is no longer a myth. Here is where China suffered its total defeat," since it was unable to dispell this myth "or to punish Vietnam, over which it had tremendous numerical superiority."<sup>11</sup>

China's military plans clearly failed in that China was unable to force the SRV to leave Cambodian patriots without aid, which would have allowed Beijing and its henchmen to once again subject the Cambodian people to a regime of genocide.

Many foreign observers note that the Chinese troops were lucky in that Vietnam never committed its regular troops to the battle because, as the Japanese newspaper (SANKEI SHIMBUN) predicted on 7 March of this year, at the climax of the battles, "were the DRV's regular troops, which are outfitted with the latest weapons, to take part in the battles, Chinese troops would find themselves in a more-complex situation."

The Chinese command made a serious mistake in its evaluation of Vietnam's combat readiness and of the capability its armed forces had for opposing aggression. The previously cited WALL STREET JOURNAL recognized, not without bitterness, that if the battles of China in Vietnam proved anything, it was that the Vietnamese are in a position to defend themselves successfully. "China clearly had numerical superiority, but the Vietnamese were not at all inferior to them in steadfastness, and their weapons were clearly more sophisticated than China's obsolete gear."<sup>12</sup>

The only thing in which Chinese aggressors were "successful" was implementing a scorched earth policy. Beijing's robber legions mercilessly shot old men, women, and children, paving their bloody path over Vietnamese soil with the bodies of innocent people. In the city of Lao Cai, for example, they shot a teacher and children who had been late in evacuating. The Chinese command created special units to steal state, cooperative, and personal property. Farm animals, agricultural equipment, factory equipment, food, and articles belonging to the people, including children's underwear, were all removed to China. And whatever could not be taken was demolished and burned, transforming into heaps of ruins and ashes. In the captured regions the Chinese interventionists razed all cities, towns, villages, plants, mines, and electric power plants, 428 hospitals, 375 general schools, and 691 children's nurseries.

Copying the actions of the Nazi hordes on territory they had temporarily occupied in the USSR and a number of European countries during World War II, the Chinese Army graced itself with perpetual infamy.

The aggressors did a great deal of economic damage to Vietnam, having destroyed the entire economy in its border provinces.

China suffered total failure in the political aspects as well. It was unable to shake the USSR's position in Southeast Asia or undermine its friendship with the DRV. In the eye of the world public, China appeared as a state capable of all crimes against mankind in behalf of its self-interested goals.

Beijing's political defeat also lay in the fact that even the Western and Eastern patrons of its aggression found themselves, in the words of the WALL STREET JOURNAL, in an extremely embarrassing position for having "blessed China's militarist designs."<sup>13</sup> Beijing also lost in that it received the condemnation of the entire international workers and communist movement for its treacherous actions against the DRV.

The USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity, which displayed international solidarity with socialist Vietnam, stayed firmly and consistently on the side of the Vietnamese people. They resolutely condemned Chinese aggression against the fraternal people of the SRV and expressed angry perturbation over this act of treachery, recklessness, and adventurism. The fraternal countries of socialism did everything to unmask the real face of the Chinese aggressors, cynics who for practical purposes were following the path of old China's feudal-monarchical rulers who had dreamed of subjugating the peoples of Southeast Asia. Countries of the socialist fraternity persuasively revealed the true essence of Beijing's "fist diplomacy" and the parallel nature of its interests and the interests of American imperialism.

The barbarian nature of Chinese aggression and its danger to universal peace and security were revealed in statements by CPSU executives and in a number of documents of the Soviet government. On 2 March L. I. Brezhnev said: "By their unprecedentedly bare barbarian attack upon a small neighboring country--socialist Vietnam, the present Beijing rulers have conclusively uncovered, for all the world to see, the insidious, aggressive essence of the great-power hegemonic policy they follow. Now it is clear for all to see that this policy is precisely what offers the most serious threat to peace in all the world today. Today more than ever before, the danger of all forms of adherence to this policy is clear."<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet Union did everything required of it by its international duty to the socialist country, as followed from the very spirit of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. A declaration published by the Soviet Union after the beginning of Chinese aggression gave a thorough class-based evaluation of the Chinese leadership's policy of blackmail and hegemonism in Indochina on the eve of the treacherous attack on Vietnam, and of the adventurism of the aggression itself. "China's attack on Vietnam testifies yet once more to how irresponsible Beijing is toward the fate of peace, to the criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership puts its arms in motion."<sup>16</sup> The Soviet government categorically warned the Chinese aggressors that the USSR would satisfy all of the obligations it had assumed by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam. It decisively demanded a cessation of aggression and immediate withdrawal of Chinese Troops from Vietnamese territory.

Undertaking its invasion of the SRV, Beijing counted on placing the USSR in a difficult position. But even in this the Chinese politicians and strategists made a great mistake. While strictly informing the aggressor of the punishment he will have to serve for his encroachment upon Vietnamese soil, the USSR at the same time displayed calm confidence, foresight, and restraint. It would not bring joy to those circles beyond the ocean that dreamed of seeing an armed conflict between the USSR and the PRC, but it simultaneously provided all assistance to the SRV which its Vietnamese friends felt required by the concrete circumstances. This aid played its role in that the Beijing hope of a blitzkrieg was dashed to pieces and that the interventionists were able to experience, on their own skins, the tremendous military potential of Vietnam, which possesses faithful and strong friends such as the USSR, which never leaves a friend in need. This is why Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Comrade (La Zuan) was able to say with full grounds: "The people and army of Vietnam firmly believe in their comrade in arms, their faithful friend

and dear brother--the glorious Communist Fatherland of the Soviet Union, the government and the great Soviet people. The help, advice and support of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries are, in addition to the strong support of the peoples of the world, a tremendous source of inspiration to the army and people of Vietnam in its repulsion of Chinese aggression."<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet Union is already giving fraternal assistance to Vietnam in restoration of economies destroyed by the Chinese invaders in the country's northern provinces. In particular, 75 percent of the savings accrued by the Vietnamese Communist regime Work Day Dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of V. I. Lenin's Birthday has been placed in an aid fund for Vietnamese people who had suffered from China's barbarian aggression. The Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee declared that this "is effective support of tremendous significance."<sup>18</sup>

The withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of the SRV was basically completed after the 15 days of battle, which practically signified China's renunciation of the total failure of its expansionist plans. But in a few areas, especially waters, the Chinese units did manage to dig in. The Chinese still attempt to maintain a garrison of more than half a million in regions neighboring with Vietnam, and it has concentrated 12 fully manned divisions in the direct proximity to the SRV border. New units and formations have been brought in from the deeper regions of China. Military fortifications are being built. Artillery strikes are being made against population centers in Vietnam, and other provocations are being attempted. Threats of military attack on Vietnam are emanating from Beijing. The Chinese leaders did everything to complicate the situation and frighten the Vietnamese side in the course of the Vietnam-China talks held from 18 April to 18 May of this year in Hanoi. They wanted to force the SRV to accept China's expansionist demands, and to agree to a role of Beijing's obedient weapon, but the SRV refused to accept the PRC's brazen solicitations.

Hand in hand with China's measures, hostile to peace and directed at further complicating relations with socialist countries, mainly the USSR, is the unilateral decision of the Beijing leadership, declared on 3 April of this year, to terminate, and in fact to terminate the action of the Treaty of Friendship, Union, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC following expiration of its 10-year deadline 1 April 1980. A declaration by the Soviet government published on 3 April of this year stated directly that this decision by China's rulers has the goal of erasing everything good and positive that had existed in the mutual relationships between the peoples of the USSR and China, of "building a wall of enmity" between them.<sup>19</sup>

This new shameful act of treachery by China, which is openly hostile in its relationships with the USSR and all of the socialist world, once again confirms the danger of Beijing's foreign policy course to neighboring countries and to universal peace.

Despite China's deceit in its aggressive war against socialist Vietnam, the danger of new military adventures by Chinese Magists in Asia persists. Beijing will not abandon its threats of once again resorting to arms. This is why

all peace-loving forces interested in checking the Chinese hegemonists must be alert.

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1. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1979, p 78.
2. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1979, p 67.
3. "Vizit v Sovetskiy Soyuz partiynno-pravitel'stvennoy delegatsii Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki V'yetnam. 1-9 noyabrya 1978 goda" (Visit of the Party-Government Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Soviet Union. 1-9 November 1978), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 14.
4. Ibid., p 19.
6. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 9, 1979, p 6.
7. UNITA, February 16, 1979.
8. PRAVDA, 26 February 1979.
10. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8 March 1979.
11. GUARDIAN, March 9, 1979.
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14. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8 March 1979.
15. Brezhnev, L. I., "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" (In Behalf of the Welfare of the Soviet People), Moscow, Izd-vo Izvestiya, 1979, p 8.
16. PRAVDA, 19 February 1979.
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## PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET FAR EAST TROOPS IN WW II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 73-77

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by S. Isayev: "Contribution of Far East Troops in the Defeat of the German-Fascist Invaders"]

[Text] When military activities began on the Soviet-German front, the Supreme High Command General Headquarters gave the troops of the Far Eastern Front and the Transbaykal Military District the mission of covering the Soviet border with Manchuria, Korea, and Japan, and of being constantly ready to repel possible aggression by Japanese militarists. Moreover it commanded them to prepare reserves for the Soviet-German front. The results of the war showed that the Far Easterners honorably completed the missions given to them.

A significant quantity of different ground formations and units was formed and trained during the war in the Far Eastern Front and the Transbaykal Military District (the Transbaykal Front as of 15 September 1941). The Headquarters used a large proportion of these formations to replenish its reserves.

The first strategic regrouping of troops from the Far East to the western theater of war was performed just before the Great Patriotic War began. Thus in the second half of April 1941, in connection with sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in Europe and the direct preparations being made by fascist Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union, the Communist Party made a decision to strengthen its western troop grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces immediately with forces of the Internal and Southern military districts, the Far East, and the Transbaykal.<sup>2</sup> By 22 June 1941 the Far Eastern Front and the Transbaykal Military District contributed the following to the western grouping of Soviet troops as reinforcements: the field directorate of the 16th Combined Arms Army, two rifle and one mechanized corps (totaling two rifle, two tank, and one motorized division and two separate regiments), and two airborne brigades (see Table), for a total of more than 57,000 men, more than 670 guns and mortars,<sup>3</sup> 1,070 light tanks, and other men and equipment. The Supreme High Command

General Headquarters used these troops on the Soviet-German front in the very first months of the war, where they fought defensive operations on the Western and Southwestern strategic axes.

**Numbers of Formations and Units Sent From the Far East to the Soviet-German Front in 1941-1945**

(1)		(2) Отправлено в период времени:				(3) Всего	
Образования, соединения и отдельные части		21.6 1941 г.	22.6.1941 г. - 18.11.1942 г.	19.11.42 г. - 31.12.1943 г.	1.1.44 г. - 9.5.1945 г.	(5) Всего в составе:	
						(4) общее количество	
						ДНФ (6)	ЗДФ (7)
(8)	Полевые управления армий:	1	—	—	—	1	1
(9)	Управления корпусов:	—	—	—	—	—	—
(10)	— стрелковых . . . .	2	—	—	—	2	1
(11)	— механизированных	1	—	—	—	1	1
	(12) Итого	3	—	—	—	3	2
(13)	Дивизии:						
(14)	— стрелковые . . . .	2	21	1*	—	24	11
(15)	— кавалерийские . . .	—	—	3	—	3	1
(16)	— танковые . . . . .	2	5	—	—	7	3
(17)	— моторизованные	1	1	—	—	2	1
	(12) Итого	5	27	4	—	36	16
(18)	Бригады:						
(19)	— стрелковые . . . .	—	4	—	—	4	1
(20)	— воздушно-десантные	—	—	—	—	—	—
(21)	— артиллерийские . .	2	—	14	1	17	1
	(12) Итого	2	4	14	1	21	2
(22)	Отдельные полки:	2	1	3	4	10	6

- \* The 106th Rifle Division, formed within the composition of the Transbaykal Front out of troops of the NKVD.

**Key:**

- |   |                        |
|---|------------------------|
| 1. Major formations, formations, and separate units | 10. Rifle              |
| 2. Sent in the following time periods:              | 11. Mechanized         |
| 3. To all   | 12. Total              |
| 4. Total number                                     | 13. Divisions          |
| 5. To include                                       | 14. Cavalry            |
| 6. Far Eastern Front                                | 15. Tank               |
| 7. Transbaykal Front                                | 16. Motorized          |
| 8. Army field directorates                          | 17. Brigades           |
| 9. Corps directorates                               | 18. Airborne           |
|   | 19. Artillery          |
|   | 20. Separate regiments |

Fascist Germany's surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, interruption of the plan for deploying Soviet troops to cover the western borders, the unfavorable outcome of border engagements, and the large losses in men and military equipment in the first operations of the war forced the Supreme High Command General Headquarters to expend almost all of its reserves. In order to replenish them, it had to immediately transfer some of the regular formations and units from the Far Eastern borders without awaiting the full deployment of new formations.<sup>4</sup> Thus in the period from 22 June to 5 December 1941 12 rifle, 5 tank, and 1 motorized division were transferred to the western theater of war from the Far Eastern and Transbaykal fronts. The average strength of these formations was almost 92 percent of their authorized manning. They contained a total of 122,617 enlisted men and officers, 2,188 guns and mortars, 1,109 light tanks, 12,032 motor vehicles, and 1,534 tractors and prime movers.<sup>5</sup> The Supreme High Command General Headquarters concentrated almost all of these forces and resources on the most highly threatened Western strategic axis: Ten rifle, four tank, and one motorized division were placed within the composition of the Western, Leningrad, and Stalingrad fronts. The remaining three rifle divisions and one tank division were placed by the Joint All Headquarters into the composition of the 4th and 7th Separate Armies of the Northwestern axis.

In all on the Soviet-German front, taking account of the prewar regrouping, the defensive engagements of 1941 involved, just within the composition of 23 divisions and two brigades from the Far East, up to 700,000 Far Eastern soldiers armed with about 3,000 guns and mortars, more than 3,200 light tanks, over 18,000 motor vehicles, and 2,000 tractors and prime movers. This was almost 8 percent of the divisions and more than 2 percent of the brigades of the Supreme High Command General Headquarters' total reserves brought in by the latter to reinforce the operating fronts in the summer-fall campaign.<sup>6</sup>

In the period from 5 December 1941 to 30 April 1942 the Supreme High Command General Headquarters brought in an insignificant quantity of ground troops to the Soviet-German front from the Far East due to the greater activity of Japanese militarists: Only two rifle divisions were transferred from the Transbaykal Front to the western theater of war, and only one cavalry regiment was transferred from the Far Eastern Front. The strength of these formations attained complete authorized manning. They possessed 44,078 men, 55 guns and mortars, and 397 motor vehicles.<sup>7</sup> These troops took part in the battle of Moscow within the composition of the Western Front.

In summer and fall 1942, when the Wehrmacht was savagely rushing toward the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command once again accelerated its preparations for a strike against the Soviet Far East by the Kwantung Army, which by this time was ready for an attack. Unable to decide to initiate open hostilities against the USSR, Japanese militarists took on the obligation of helping out the fascist German troops by creating a tense situation in the Far East.<sup>8</sup>

However, the demand for new forces made it necessary for the General Headquarters to transfer 10 rifle divisions from the Far East to the Stalingrad and Southeastern fronts and four rifle brigades to the Bryansk Front in the period from 1 May to 18 November 1942. The total strength of troops and armament was 148,918 enlisted men and officers, 1,644 guns and mortars, 36 light tanks, 2,048 motor vehicles, and 199 tractors and prime movers. The average manning of Far Eastern formations and units going to the Soviet-German front during this time was very high, attaining 98.6 percent.<sup>11</sup>

As we know, in April-October 1942 the Supreme High Command General Headquarters sent 198 rifle divisions and 78 rifle brigades to the operating army;<sup>12</sup> however, only 5.3 percent of the divisions and 5.1 percent of the brigades in this number were taken from the composition of the Far Eastern troop grouping.

In winter 1942-1943 the General Headquarters could not discount the possibility of Japanese aggression, and therefore despite complications in the vicinity of Stalingrad it limited further removal of Far Eastern troops to the Soviet-German front in the period from 19 November 1942 to 1 April 1943 to just one rifle and three cavalry divisions, six howitzer artillery brigades, and three mortar regiments, totaling 34,312 men and possessing 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks, 1,125 motor vehicles, and 272 tractors and prime movers.<sup>13</sup> Two divisions (rifle and cavalry) and two brigades were placed within the composition of the Central Front, two divisions, four brigades, and two regiments were placed in the Bryansk Front, and one regiment was sent to the Steppe Military District, where strategic reserves were being created for the battle of Kursk.

Because a relatively small quantity of fighting forces and resources were sent to the Soviet-German front, the command of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal fronts was able to significantly raise its combat readiness in this critical period. The greater power of Soviet troops in the Far East, which was owing to the thrifty and careful use of these troops by the Supreme High Command General Headquarters, and the annihilatory defeat of German troops at Stalingrad forced Japan to once again refrain from aggression against the USSR in winter 1942-1943.

During the strategic lull of 1943 only eight howitzer brigades (8,703 men, 233 field guns of large calibers, 698 motor vehicles, and 410 tractors and prime movers) were transferred from the Far East to the western theater of war.<sup>14</sup> In this case six brigades were sent by the Supreme High Command General Headquarters as reinforcements to the Western (two), Bryansk (two), and Kalinin and Leningrad (correspondingly one each) fronts. Two brigades were sent to the Moscow Military District for replenishment of combat units. After this, in January 1944, they were placed within the composition of the 2d Ukrainian Front.

The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East to the western theater of war was completed during the summer-fall campaign of 1944. At that time one more airborne brigade and four high-power howitzer artillery regiments containing 6,100 men were sent to the Soviet-German front. They were armed with 80 guns and mortars, 9 light tanks, 210 motor vehicles, and 148 tractors and prime movers.<sup>15</sup> The Supreme High Command General Headquarters used the incoming forces and resources mainly to replenish formations and units sent to the rear for replenishment. Only one artillery regiment was sent to the Leningrad Front to serve in the 127th Gun Artillery Brigade.

In all (taking account of the prewar regrouping) the General Headquarters transferred 39 divisions, 21 brigades, and 10 separate regiments representing different arms and services of the ground troops to the operating army from the Far East in the Great Patriotic War (see Table). The remaining formations and units formed within the Far Eastern and Transbaykal fronts were left in those fronts by the Supreme High Command General Headquarters to reinforce their combat compositions.

The total manning of Far Eastern troops sent to the Soviet-German front during the war was more than 400,000 men. They were armed with more than 5,000 guns and mortars, over a 2,300 tanks, and much other combat equipment and armament. Moreover additional troops and a large quantity of armament and combat equipment were sent as replenishment to formations and units operating in the western theater of war from the Far Eastern and Transbaykal fronts in 1941-1945.

The Supreme High Command General Headquarters allocated more than a thousand railroad trains to insure timely shipment of this quantity of combat forces and resources.<sup>17</sup>

The Supreme High Command General Headquarters immediately placed formations and units transferred from the Far East into the composition of troops taking part in the most decisive engagements and battles of the Great Patriotic War (Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk, and so on). Far Eastern soldiers graced themselves with unfading glory. More than 20 Far Eastern and Transbaykal formations earned the Guards title. Tens of thousands of soldiers from the Far East were awarded USSR orders and medals, and about 1,600 enlisted men and officers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title for combat heroism on the Soviet-German front.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, analyzing the statistics presented above, we can be visually persuaded of the fact that in addition to strengthening the defense capabilities of the USSR in the Far East, for the first 3 years of the Great Patriotic War the Communist Party Central Committee, the Soviet government, and the Supreme High Command General Headquarters competently utilized the Far Eastern troop grouping as one of the significant sources of replenishment for our formations on the Soviet-German front in the most serious and critical moments of the war against fascist Germany,



and at times of a clear threat of an attack upon the Soviet Far East by imperialist Japan. All of this is an indication of the tremendous organizational role played by the Communist Party, of its daily and flexible leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945, and of the superiority of Soviet over bourgeois military science.

#### FOOTNOTES

2. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkaya istoriya" (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. A Short History), 2d edition, revised and supplemented, Voenizdat, 1970, p 53.
3. Here and subsequently the number of mortars is cited not counting 50-mm mortars.
4. Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" (Recollections and Deliberations), Vol 1, Izd-vo APN, 1974, p 228.
5. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives]: f. 13-A, op. 396, s. 25, ll. 66, 114, 133; d. 26, ll. 11, 59, 66, 77, 78, 295; d. 28, l. 122; f. 15-A, d. 2, l. 33; op. 1845, d. 17, ll. 71-72.
6. Calculated on the basis of data in the book "Pyat'desyat let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" (Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces), Voenizdat, 1968, p 273.
7. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 13-A, op. 396, d. 28, l. 44; op. 505, d. 133, l. 5.
8. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945. V 12-ti tomakh" (History of World War II 1939-1945. In 12 Volumes), Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1975, p 387.
11. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 13-A, op. 505, d. 135, ll. 159, 240; d. 145, ll. 8, 122, 194, 233, 259, 314.
12. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1971, p 14.
13. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 13-A, op. 504, d. 153, l. 6; d. 155, l. 7; d. 165, l. 62; d. 167, ll. 13, 37, 55, 100.
14. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 13-A, op. 504, d. 157, l. 8; d. 166, l. 77; d. 169, ll. 64, 87, 105, 147.
15. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 13-A, op. 503, d. 94, l. 193; d. 99, l. 325; d. 100, ll. 35, 59, 303.

17. Computed from data of the TsAMO SSSR: f. 14-A, op. 272, d. 23, ll. 1-31; d. 26, ll. 80-145.
18. "Krasnoznamennyy Dal'nevostochnyy" (The Red Banner Far Eastern), Voenizdat, 1971, p 187; "Zabaykal'skiy voyennyy okrug" (The Transbaykal Military District), Irkutsk, 1972, p 272.

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#### MILITARY HISTORY INSTRUCTION MATERIAL OFFERED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 77-83

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information" as an "Aid to Teachers of Military History" and based on foreign press material, by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col P. Tsygankov, and Col O. Kudryashov: "Mehtods for Lecturing on 'Organizational Development of the Armed Forces of the Main Capitalist States After World War II. Local Wars 1946-1973'" ]

[Text] Examination of the following basic questions would be suitable in lectures given to students in schools of the ground troops:

1. The aggressive nature of imperialism--15 minutes.
2. Development of nuclear and conventional armament and organization of ground troops; change of viewpoints on combat activities--30 minutes.
3. The causes and nature of local wars in 1946-1973, and their influence on art of war, tactics especially; the lessons learned from local wars--40 minutes.

In relation to students in military schools of other branches of the armed forces, more attention should be devoted to the development of the organization and art of war of the corresponding branch of armed forces.

Presenting material on the first question revealing the aggressive nature of imperialism, the instructor must show that formation of the world socialist system after World War II and the broad scope of the revolutionary movement and the movement of national liberation undermined the positions of imperialism in the world arena even more. A new phase began in the overall crisis of capitalism. "Fundamental changes in the balance of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism," states the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945," "deprived imperialism of its possibility for dispensing with the fates of nations without punishment, such that it could no longer ignore the might of the socialist countries...."<sup>1</sup>

However, the aggressive nature of imperialism had not changed. It is still trying to use force to resolve its principal social contradictions, the main one today being the contradiction between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism. Immediately following World War II the large capitalist countries made an alliance of convenience their priority task. This goal of their policy was the decisive factor predetermining development of the armed forces for many long years. A rabid arms race began. The ruling circles of the imperialist countries spent billions to create new types of weapons and combat equipment. While in 1949 NATO bloc countries spent \$18.7 billion for military needs, in 1958 the military outlays came close to \$1.4 billion and in 1977 they exceeded \$165 billion. In less than 30 years the NATO bloc spent \$2.45 trillion for military purposes.<sup>2</sup> Thus the threat of war hangs constantly over the world.

In correspondence with their political goals, the imperialist powers developed military doctrines which by definition have a reactionary, anticommunist, anti-democratic orientation. These are the main fundamental principles of these doctrines have never changed. Thus the political essence of the USA's military doctrine is based on the desire of the imperialism to perpetuate the supremacy of capitalism, liquidate or weaken the world socialist system, economically and politically enslave other countries, and attain world supremacy.

The military doctrines of other capitalist powers, while differing from one another in relation to the scale of aspirations for guiding world policy, at the same time have common traits, such as recognition of the need for coordinating their plans with U.S. strategy and the desire to impart a "defensive" nature to their military actions and goals while representing the Soviet Union in the form of the potential aggressor.

As far as the military-technical side of the military doctrines of capitalist countries is concerned, being a more-mobile element depending on the current level of the resources of armed conflict and influencing them directly, it underwent a complex path of development in the postwar years. This was especially evident from changes in strategic conceptions and the basic orientations of armed forces development.

In order to unite efforts in the struggle against communism, capitalist countries began hammering together aggressive military-political alliances. The NATO bloc was created in Europe in 1949, SEATO was created in Southeast Asia in 1954, and CENTO was created in the Near East in 1955. Remilitarization of West Germany and its inclusion in the NATO bloc activated the vengefulness of the ruling circles of the FRG and led to resurrection of a seat of war in Europe.

International reaction progressed from veiled war preparations to overt acts of aggression. In 1950 the USA unleashed a war against the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic. In 1956 England, France, and Israel initiated aggression against Egypt. In subsequent years imperialism unleashed a

number of wars in different regions of the world. As a result dangerous centers of tension arose in the Far East, and later in the Near East.

This is why the Communist Party and Soviet government were forced to do everything they could to strengthen the might of our motherland and its armed forces, nurturing the Soviet people and the soldiers in the spirit of high alertness and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism.

Going on to the second question, the instructor should place his main focus on development of the U.S. Armed Forces. He should point out that following World War II, the USA, which continued to maintain large army and naval forces (about 3 million men) and possessed the atomic bomb, assumed a course toward establishment of world supremacy. In view of their insufficient quantity, however, prior to the early 1950's nuclear weapons were used mainly as the tools of "atomic diplomacy."

The fundamental principle behind development of the armed forces was "balanced development," and the essence of the USA's strategic conceptions of those days was proportionate utilization of all branches of the armed forces in a war. However, as a result of swift growth in production of atomic bombs, especially those of larger caliber, as early as in the late 1940's the principle of "balanced development" gradually gave way to preferential development of strategic aviation--the sole means for delivering a nuclear weapon at that time. The piston engined B-29 strategic bombers were replaced by turbojet medium (B-47) and heavy (B-52) bombers.

Soon the USA began producing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. In the period from 1954 to the early 1960's all branches of the armed forces were supplied with considerable numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The instructor should describe the principal tactical and strategic nuclear strike resources: free-flight rockets--"Honest John," guided missiles--"Chaparral," "Redstone," "Lacrosse," antiaircraft guided missiles--"Hawk," "Nike-Hercules," and "Polaris" and "Minuteman" missiles. Then he should note that the air force, especially tactical aviation, enjoyed swift development prior to 1958. Later, however, in connection with extensive introduction of guided missiles and free-flight rockets, production of airplanes, mainly bombers, began to decrease.

Conventional weapons of the ground troops also underwent improvement. The most significant changes occurred in armored equipment; intense efforts were made to completely renew the tank fleet. In the first postwar years the following medium tanks were adopted: M-26 "Pershing," M-46, M-47 "Patton" and somewhat later the tank M-48 "Patton-III." It became the USA's main medium tank until appearance of the M-60 tank in the early 1960's.

Self-propelled guns became the backbone of artillery. Improved models of the 105-mm, 155-mm, and 203-mm self-propelled howitzers were designed.

Beginning with the mid-1950's France, and in the late 1950's some other countries began arming their forces with antitank guided missiles, which became the most effective antitank resources.

The organizational structure of the ground troops did not experience any sort of significant changes in the first postwar years. Their fighting power was increased due to replacement of obsolete combat equipment by new equipment, and due to a certain enlargement of the number of tanks, guns, and mortars in the formations.

The means of preparing and conducting combat activities differed little in this stage from those developed in the course of World War II. Their re-examination began in the 1950's, when the possibility for using nuclear weapons on the battlefield to attain operational and tactical objectives appeared. Nuclear weapons came to be thought of as the principal weapons to be used against the enemy in the battle and in the operation.

In this connection the so-called "strategy of mass retaliation" was laid at the basis of the USA's military doctrine beginning in the 1950's. Its essence was that all political goals were to be attained by the threat of using nuclear weapons, and by their actual use if necessary.

A course toward preparation for only one type of war against the USSR--general nuclear war--was taken at that time; local wars were intended only for the purposes of suppressing movements of national liberation and revolutionary movements.

In 1956 the USA began reorganizing its ground troops, adapting their organization to nuclear war alone. A course toward highly mobile, maneuverable formations was assumed. Infantry divisions of regimental composition were reorganized as so-called "pertomic" divisions consisting of five combat groups, a tank battalion, and a 105-mm howitzer battalion. The quantity of personnel and combat equipment (artillery especially) was significantly reduced, and the maneuverability of the divisions was increased. Each of the infantry and armored divisions was outfitted with four "Honest John" free flight rocket launchers and four 203.2-mm howitzers capable of firing nuclear ammunition. In terms of combat activities not involving nuclear weapons, however, the divisions were weak in firepower, and their combat groups did not have the needed independence.

England, France, and the FRG tended to organize their divisions such that they could engage in combat activities with and without nuclear weapons. Divisions consisted of brigades (tank or motorized infantry) and divisional units of unified organization. The type of division depended on the quantity and types of brigades. Thus a tank (armored) division included two tank and one motorized infantry brigade, while a motorized infantry (mechanized) division included two motorized infantry and one tank brigade.



The so-called "flexible response" strategy was placed at the basis of U.S. military doctrine in 1961 in connection with the growing nuclear missile power of the USSR; this strategy was subsequently adopted by the NATO bloc. It absorbed within itself the premises of the "mass retaliation" strategy, it was supplemented by the "limited war" theory, and it presupposed "dosed application of military force commensurate with the scale of arising danger." This strategy foresaw the possibility of universal nuclear war, war involving limited use of nuclear weapons, conventional war in a theater of war, and conventional (local) war in a limited region.

The organization of the ground troops experienced a number of significant changes in this connection. The reorganization was performed with the goal of increasing both nuclear and conventional firepower and raising the mobility and controllability of units and formations. U.S. Army divisions now assume a unified organizational structure. They included artillery units, special subunits, support and maintenance subunits, and fighting battalions, the quantity and types of which determined the type of division. The composition of an armored division included six tank and five motorized infantry battalions; the newly created mechanized division contained three tank and seven motorized infantry battalions; the infantry division had eight infantry and two tank battalions.

Changes in troop armament and organization led to major changes in viewpoints on the conduct of combat activities. It was decided that a future war would be maneuverable rather than static. Combat activities would develop on individual axes and proceed at a high rate, with various forms of maneuver, airborne landings and air troop transfers being employed. Enemy defenses were to be penetrated on the move as a rule. Armored formations and units also began to be placed in the assault echelons with the goal of capitalizing as quickly as possible on the results of using nuclear weapons. Water obstacles, including large ones, were to be crossed on the move. The experience of NATO exercises in Europe showed that the scope of combat activities of the ground troops had risen dramatically.

Massed use of nuclear weapons to achieve the most important objectives was foreseen. As the quantity of nuclear ammunition available increased, the range of its application grew continuously. The principal strategic nuclear attack weapons became the Polaris at sea, and the Minuteman on land. These missiles were subsequently to be replaced by the more-sophisticated systems Poseidon and Minuteman-3 with dispensing warheads.

Improved Sergeant and Pershing guided missiles entered the ground troops in the 1960's, and the Lance was adopted in 1972. Nuclear weapon delivery resources were also introduced extensively into the armies of countries allied to the USA in aggressive blocs; nuclear ammunition, meanwhile, was to be issued from American dumps by decision of the American government.

Mobile (maneuverable) defense became the principal form of defense. In lecture, the instructor should briefly describe its features and principles. He should point out that some changes have occurred in viewpoints on static defense as well. In particular, fast withdrawal of troops was foreseen in connection with the use of nuclear weapons, for which reason the depth of defenses and the width of the zones covered by formations and units were increased.

These nuclear weapons raised the combat potential of the troops and imposed new requirements on them. The scope of offensive operations increased significantly, and the swiftness and maneuverability of actions grew. The stability of defense increased, and maneuverable defense became the principal type. It was given more decisive objectives, going as far as total defeat of the advancing enemy.

At the same time, beginning with the 1960's more attention was devoted to developing conventional weapons and material intended for combat not involving nuclear weapons. The local wars of 1946-1973 are a confirmation of this.

Going on to the third question, the instructor should emphasize that there are three types of local wars: between individual capitalist countries; between capitalist and socialist countries; between imperialist states and peoples fighting for national liberation. One of the main causes of local wars is the imperialist policy of oppressing small nations. It would be pertinent at this time to quote the words of V. I. Lenin, who said that imperialism "accelerates development of capitalism in the most backward countries, and thus expands and aggravates the struggle against national oppression. This is a fact. And from whence it inevitably follows it is not unusual for imperialism to generate national wars."<sup>1</sup>

Explaining the nature of local wars, the instructor must indicate the objectives pursued by imperialist states: restoration of reactionary regimes to achieve political dominance in important economic regions of the globe; provision of raw materials and manpower to imperialist states, and attainment of advantageous strategic positions for them in preparation for a world war against the socialist countries; suppression of revolutionary struggle in colonial and dependent countries; utilization of foreign territory as a practice range for preparing imperialist armies for world war. Hence it follows that all local wars initiated by imperialists following World War II were antinational, reactionary, and predatory. One of the unique features of local wars of the postwar era is their coalitional nature on one side and sometimes on both sides;<sup>2</sup> another unique feature is that preparations are made for them and they are initiated and conducted in the presence of a dramatically changing balance of power in the international arena in the presence of the growing influence of socialism, which has a decisive effect on the course of world development, and this dooms the aggressor to futility in local wars, both in the sociopolitical and the military respects.

Another unique feature of modern imperialist local wars is the extreme cruelty and inhumanity of the methods and resources employed by the aggressors, and their neglect of international law. Brazen militarists subject the peaceful population to cruel methods such as the "scorched earth policy," "free fire zone," "meteorological" or "geophysical" war, and so on.

A number of the unique features of local wars stem from the means and times of their conduct, and from the nature of the military equipment employed. The aggressor lays his principal hopes on making a surprise attack and utilizing new weapons, the latter having a significant influence on development of the art of war applicable to local wars.

Utilization of major jet and helicopter forces, surface-to-air guided missiles and antitank guided missiles, and improvements in the models of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and self-propelled guns have made offensive and defensive battles highly dynamic and their nature maneuverable and fluid. Countries subjected to attack have served as a unique testing ground where the quality and effectiveness of armament and combat equipment and the organizational structure and field skills of the troops are tested out.

The armies of capitalist countries have fought rebels predominantly by "combing" the regions they occupy. One of their new tactics was waging an offensive with aeromobile troops (as in the war in South Vietnam). In order to insure surprise and security, helicopters were flown at minimum altitude as a rule. After the main forces were landed, they pushed the enemy out of the positions he occupied and forced him to retreat in a predetermined direction. A helicopter landing party was landed in the rear of the withdrawing troops. This landing party subsequently advanced toward the main forces. By joint effort they annihilated the enemy.

In local wars with a clearly delimited enemy forward edge of defense the means of offensive actions were in many ways similar to those of the past war. Thus interventionists in Korea usually began their offensive following a powerful artillery strike against the most important defensive objectives. In mountainous terrain, however, the offensive usually proceeded on different axes. In the Arab-Israeli wars the Israelis usually combined frontal thrusts with maneuver on the flank and in the rear. In this case armored subunits were often employed in the assault echelon to breach tactical defenses, and to act as forward detachments and reconnaissance elements. Airborne troops were given a special place in the offensive battle. Sometimes in the course of pursuit they were even used as forward detachments. Depending on the importance of the objective sought, their composition varied: from small groups of paratroopers to individual airborne units.<sup>5</sup>

Tactics of defensive battle waged by the subunits and units of aggressor armies are also typified by a number of unique features. In most local wars, owing to absence of continuous fronts, defenses were organized

mainly by creating a system of centers of resistance and strongpoints in cities, major population centers, at road junctions, and so on. Lines of communication, power transmission lines, water pipelines, and other linear objectives were defended by combat posts located along these objectives. Strongpoints, centers of resistance, and posts were furnished with a branched system of trenches, pillboxes, wire entanglements, and minefields.

However, the combat experience in Vietnam and Algeria demonstrated that such defenses meant dispersal of forces and isolation of individual garrisons. Units of the peoples liberation armies capitalized upon this quite successfully to defeat interventionists in parts.

Discussing the art of war of peoples liberation armies, the instructor should point out that they employed diverse methods of combat activities in offensive and defensive battles. Thus in the war of the Vietnamese people against French colonists, the offensive tactic of annihilating the enemy in fortified points and areas enjoyed broad application. In the first phase of such a battle, units of the peoples army surrounded the fortified areas and then attacked them swiftly from all sides, while garrisons were separated into parts and annihilated. Communication trenches were dug to pillboxes and centers of resistance (strongpoints), and tunnels were dug beneath them to lay landmines. Later, after a fire strike and explosion of the landmines, annihilation of the garrison was completed by a simultaneous attack against the planned objectives.

In the war of the Vietnamese people against American aggressors, offensive battles were distinguished by extreme activity and maneuverability. Compact groupings were not created in connection with the extremely pronounced spotty nature of enemy defenses. Strongpoints were attacked by forces of company (battalion) strength, and in only rare cases were regiments (divisions) called in. Enemy strongpoints were approached covertly. If the object of attack was deep in occupied territory, men and equipment were accumulated at the forming-up place by infiltration through gaps between strongpoints in the enemy's first line of defense. The attack was made swiftly, and as a rule at night, followed by withdrawal into the jungle.

These offensive tactics were also typical of other liberation armies. In the war in Algeria, small garrisons, communication centers, and storage dumps were usually annihilated at night. The raids were made swiftly. Following annihilation of the objective, the Algerian Army detachments withdrew immediately. A good knowledge of the terrain, excellent, organized reconnaissance and high mobility and maneuverability made it possible to maintain the initiative with small detachments.

The defensive tactics of national liberation armies were active and maneuverable in most cases. Troops held successive defensive lines, making broad use of sieges and counterattacks. In mountainous areas the defenses consisted mainly of a system of strongpoints and centers of resistance located in the tactically most important places--mountain tops, passes, defiles, road junctions, and so on.

The Korean War offers the most instructive examples of organizing and conducting defensive battles. Defenses were organized in the tactical zone with the intent of holding firmly onto the main zone and possibly using back-up echelons and reserves in a counterattack. Tunnels (galleries) communicating closely with a system of personnel and communication trenches enjoyed broad application in defensive battles. Shelters were covered with a protective layer of dirt having a volume up to 30-50 m<sup>3</sup>, and they were able to easily withstand hits by 500-kg bombs. A network of trenches and pillboxes was created above galleries and between entrances to them. On the average up to 1 km of underground shelters, up to 5 km of trenches, and 2-3 km of communication trenches were dug in the most important sectors of a battalion defense area. The stability of defense was also promoted by tiered disposition of trenches and gun positions, as a result of which fire was multilayered and dense.

The fight against airborne troops during areomobile operations conducted by the American troops is of interest in the local war in South Vietnam. This fight consisted of two phases. The first entailed annihilation of enemy airplanes and helicopters in the air as they traveled to the landing area; the second entailed annihilation of the landing party at the time of its landing and following it. Small infantry subunits occupied defenses beforehand in places where landings were expected, and then made surprise attacks on the landing parties. These tactics justified themselves completely, as is evident from the significant reduction of aeromobile troops in subsequent actions by the American aggressors.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, offering resistance to the enemy, the national liberation armies made their contribution to improving the methods of combat actions in a struggle against an aggressor. Utilizing armament and combat equipment supplied by socialist countries, they artfully conducted combat activities against superior enemy forces.

Studying the lessons of local wars, it should be noted that in most cases these wars were initiated by major imperialist states. The means of their initiation varied--from expansion of aggression started by troops of puppet regimes (Korea, Vietnam) to overt armed attack (the wars in the Near East and in Africa). Attempting to attain decisive success in the very beginning of the war, the aggressive forces of imperialism began their invasion with surprise air strikes and marine and airborne assault landings.

The experience of local wars shows that interdiction of the lines of communication acquires important significance in mountainous forested terrain, especially when the enemy is technically superior. Their interdiction placed the aggressor in an extremely difficult position, even forcing him to go over to the defense in a number of cases.

One of the most important factors of victory over the enemy in national wars of liberation is the partisan movement. Mountains, forests, and jungles helped along the actions of partisan detachments, since under



such conditions the enemy could not make effective use of many types of combat equipment.

The growing aggressiveness of imperialism un-entirely requires the armed forces of the USSR and the socialist countries to be in constant combat readiness to repel all aggression. Utilization of new weapons and tactics is adding new facets to the problems of troop training and indoctrination. The significance of political and ideological training had risen significantly. The practice of local wars has confirmed the fact that war continues to play the principal role. Therefore it is the duty of commanders, political workers, and school instructors to train ideologically convinced, morally tempered defenders of the motherland.

The following visual aids should be prepared for the lecture:

1. The table "Characteristics of the Principal Nuclear Weapons of the USA."
2. The diagram "Organization of the U.S. Army Infantry Division" (1957).
3. The diagram "Organization of the U.S. Army Divisional Units."
4. The diagram "The Number of Wars and Military Conflicts in 1945-1975."

#### Literature

1. "Voyennaya istoriya, uchebnik" (Military History, A Training Manual), Voenizdat, 1970, pp 309-327.
2. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva, uchebnik" (History of the Art of War, A Training Manual), Voenizdat, 1979, pp 309-362.
3. Simonyan, R. G., "Voyennyye bloki imperializma" (The Military Blocs of Imperialism), Voenizdat, 1976.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1965, pp 37-43; No 9, 1968, pp 36-51; No 3, 1975, pp 57-66, 90-97.
5. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1976, pp 13-21; No 10, pp 21-27; No 6, 1973, pp 11-15.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 9 February 1975.
2. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 12, 1978, p 74.
3. Lenin, V. I., in "Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 30, p 132.

4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1974, p. 35.
5. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva, uchebnik" (History of the Art of War, A Training Manual), Voenizdat, 1979, p. 360.
6. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva, uchebnik," Voenizdat, 1979, p. 332.
7. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1975, p. 71.
8. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1975, p. 66.

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## SOVIET MADE WAR FILM SHOWN IN U.S. REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1979 pp 84-87

[Review by Col A. Sabel'nikov: "The Film Epic 'The Great Patriotic'"]

[Text] The history of this film began at the end of 1978. The American Air Time International Company approached the All-Union Sovinfil'm Association with a proposal for creating a film series on the Great Patriotic War to be shown on American television. A title for it was also suggested--"The Unknown War." This name for the Patriotic War is hard to the ears, but it was explained by the truly unfortunate fact that most Americans were uninformed of events occurring on the Soviet-German front in 1941-1945. To create, for American viewers, a truthful and impressive story of the unprecedented heroism of the Soviet people in the struggle against the fascist invaders is an important and noble goal. The proposal was accepted. Work on the 20-part documentary film "The Great Patriotic" was assigned to the Central Documentary Film Studio, which had a considerable amount of experience in producing such films. The creative group was headed by one of our oldest documentary filmmakers, Roman Karmen. He contributed his last strength to the film. The film epic became a brilliant wreath to his heroic creative career.

A. M. Aleksandrov served as the film's general advisor, and the group of military advisors was headed by Army General P. A. Kurchkin. The American participants included: director-advisor Isaac Klinerman, writer John Lord, and poet, vocalist, and composer Rod McKuen. The English version of the film is narrated by the famous American actor Burt Lancaster. The Russian text is read by RSFSR Peoples Artist V. S. Lavova.

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- \* The film epic "The Great Patriotic." Produced by the Central Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner Documentary Film Studio in response to a request from and with the participation of the American Air Time International Company. Art director--Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize Laureate, USSR Peoples Artist R. Karmen. Screenwriters--R. Karmen, K. Skavin, I. Itskov, Editor in chief--Ye. Koryrev.

Great difficulties were encountered in work on the film. Naturally it did not begin in a vacuum. Soviet documentary filmmakers have been credited with many successful films on the Great Patriotic War, beginning with ones that appeared during the war--"The Defeat of Fascist German Troops at Moscow" by I. Kopalin and L. Varlamov, "Leningrad in Battle" by R. Karmen, N. Komarevtsev, V. Solovtsov, and Ye. Uchitel', and "The Battle For Our Soviet Ukraine" by A. Dovzhenko and ending with the recent "Winter and Spring of 'Forty-Five" by S. Zhdanova and D. Firsova. Nor can we neglect the treasurehouse of Soviet documentary filmmaking--the 4 million meters of news films taken during the war by frontal cameramen, who displayed the greatest bravery and valor in the hottest points of the battles. It is no accident that the viewer is presented in the last part of the film epic with a list of all 252 cameramen that had worked at the front. One out of every five of them never returned from the war. They are rightfully named among the authors of the film.

But this was the first time such an all-encompassing film documentary on the past war was ever attempted. It was extremely difficult to fit all of the 1,418 days and nights of fire in even 20 parts. The idea came up from the very beginning to show the film to Soviet viewers as well. This meant that it would be judged by two categories of viewers, one which was to witness the agony of war for the first time, and another that was familiar with and had experienced all the woes and difficulties. The film had to be made interesting to both groups. The distribution of the material in different parts and the chronological sequence of the presentation elicited considerable debate. Soviet and American members of the creative group were not always unanimous in their interpretation of particular points. But a business-like, comradely work style and the invariable desire to find a common language made it possible to successfully resolve all arising problems and reach common agreement.

In a period of less than a year and a half the screen writers reviewed more than a million meters of war news films from Soviet and foreign film archives, as well as captured German news films. They rephotographed places of former battles, and they obtained large numbers of filmed interviews from government and military officials, many of the rank-and-file participants of the war, and the local public.

In September 1978 the official premier of "The Unknown War" was held in Washington at the National State Archives building and in the Kennedy Center. Following the premiers, the film was shown on television in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Washington, Boston, Cleveland, Houston, and other U.S. cities. Each Saturday for 20 weeks millions of Americans followed the course of the titanic struggle of the Soviet people against fascist aggression with agitation and delight, they became convinced of the inviolability of a people rising to a holy war for the liberty and independence of their socialist motherland, and they came to sense the great contribution made by the Soviet Union to eradication of fascist barbarianism from the world. It is estimated in the USA that the film was viewed by not less than 30 million Americans.

"This film will be inscribed in gold letters in the history of world cinematography," wrote the newspaper DAILY WORLD, "since it not only truthfully recreates the great heroism of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War but also appeals for new benevolent changes on Earth in behalf of a sound peace."

"The goal of the series cannot be subjected to doubt," noted the newspaper VARIETY. "It demonstrates the spirit of a people receiving the challenge of enemies striking at the very heart, and it permits us to understand how this spirit could unite the people and emerge triumphant. It is a tribute to national strength when it can raise the people to arms."

It would be incorrect to assume that the American press carried only positive responses. It stands to reason that the enemies of peace and relaxation gave the film epic a hostile reception. Anticipating such attacks, Avrii Harriman, a prominent U.S. politician and former American ambassador to Moscow, said the following in his interview included in the film, as if to answer them: "I know quite well that L. I. Brezhnev and all of the Soviet people are truly devoted to peace. I also feel that efforts made by people in the USA who oppose relaxation and friendship with the Soviet Union do harm to the interests of the American people."

Half a year after the "American" premier the Russian language version of the film epic began to be shown in our country.

Each part of the film is a dramatically complete work. But the whole grandiose panorama of the holy peoples war reveals itself fully to the viewer when he successively sees the entire epic as a whole. The films are being viewed with unweakening attention. They capture the entire person, they elicit the most violent spiritual agitation and sympathy, and they generate pride in the Soviet people, who under the guidance of the Communist Party managed not only to endure unprecedentedly difficult trials but also cause the ruin of the greatest war machine ever created by imperialism.

Where lies the attractive force of this film work, which equally affects both the veteran and the young person, to whom the events of the war are only history?

We can begin with the fact that the film epic provides the viewers with extensive information about everything that happened during the war, information that is maximally concrete, documented, and visual. One of the merits of the epic in my estimation is that it does not drop entirely into the past; it does not break contact between the past and present: Each part begins in the present and ends in the present. Recent footage also sometimes appears on the screen in the course of the historic narration. It permits the viewer to envision the cities that have grown out of the ashes and the great memorials erected at places of savage engagements, and to hear the agitated testimony of participants of the battles and heroes in the rear. The viewer feels heart pangs on seeing a mother find, on a



never-ending list on the walls of the Stalingrad Pantheon, the infinitely precious name of her daughter--Natasha Katchayevskaya, and he is filled with joy by the sight of golden fields of waving grain covering soil at Kursk, Belgorod, and Orel that had recently been rended and covered with blood.

I would like to recall one more episode. Its screen time is short, but it is so pithy: A launch is steaming along the Black Sea coast to Novorossiysk. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev is aboard together with a group of friends. He peers with great attention at what passes by on shore. In the haze of the hot day the hills slumber, and baby blue waves splash. And yet we have just seen this same land beneath a hail of bombs and gunshells, for this is the blazing "Little Land." Not a single word is said in this episode, but it generates many lofty thoughts and feelings.

Naturally the film devotes considerable room to the combat actions themselves. The viewer sees how the strategic designs of the opposing sides are developed and implemented, images of prominent Soviet troops commanders pass before him, he hears their voices (the series includes filmed interviews with marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and V. I. Chuykov), and he can sense with his eyes from one part to the next the way the proficiency of the Soviet commanders and soldiers and the availability of weapons and combat equipment in the army grow. The scope of battles on the Soviet-German front and the losses suffered by the fascists in this struggle unambiguously testify to the fact that it was precisely the Soviet Army that had broken the back of the fascist animal, that it was precisely the Soviet Union which made the decisive contribution to the victory over fascism.

The film epic gives credit to the bravery and valor of American and British naval seamen escorting convoys to the USSR's northern ports. A special part is devoted to the arising of the anti-Hitler alliance and to the joint actions taken by the Allies during World War II. We cannot but be exalted by the bravery displayed by pilots of the famed Normandy-Neman Regiment, and by the no less famous English squadron that defended, together with Soviet pilots, the skies of Arctic Murmansk. The viewer hears with pleasure the words of Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin concerning the great qualities of the "Aerocobra" aboard which he was fortunate to fight, and he notes with gratefulness that the cargo destined for blockaded Leningrad included crates bearing American labels. But given all of this, the immutable truth still remains that 96 percent of the combat equipment and armament of our army and navy had been manufactured by Soviet industry. It is in this connection that the part "To the East" is fundamentally successful. The unprecedented movement of thousands of industrial enterprises deep into the country, deployment of defense plants at new locations, the work of transportation in the combat zone, and help rendered to the front by all the people: All of this and much else is shown in the film authentically and emotionally. Much interest is elicited by interviews with CPSU Central Committee Politburo members Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G. F.

Latunov, who managed the evacuation and redeployment of production in the rear on party orders during the war. Stories told by common laborers reveal the full content of the heroic labor of the people, who practically implemented the motto "Everything for the Front! Everything for Victory!"

The film epic provides a glimpse into the Soviet Army's mission of liberation. Savage battles on Polish soil, the battles for Vienna and Budapest, the liberation of Belgrade, Sofia, and Prague, the joyous crowds, the sea of flowers, and the revitalizing dawn of a new free life are portrayed. Soviet soldiers-internationalists did not spare themselves: The million of our best men and officers sacrificed their lives in the struggle for liberation of the countries of Europe from Hitler's oppression. Can this ever possibly be forgotten?

There can be no doubt that the film epic will serve well those who are interested in creating a true history of World War II, and it will deal a serious blow to falsifications.

The film epic was created with the highest professional skill. The part is typified by the same emotional and artistic level such that the entire series can be perceived as a single whole, bearing in sum total not only information but also the weight of a significant ideological and artistic effort.

It is first of all an image of the Soviet soldier. The film is packed with footage of numerous war participants. The soldiers filing by the viewer may represent the difficult summers of 1941 and 1942, or the subsequent victorious years, or the spring of 1945, but they are always the same in their essence: steadfast in defense, decisive in offense, simple, modest people, merciless to the enemy, but full of high humanitarianism toward the peaceful population. Soviet soldiers are often seen with children in their arms. It is no accident that a bronze Soviet soldier of liberation with a saber in one hand and a young girl pressed to his heart on the other now stands in faraway Berlin!

It was the duty of almost half of all of the soldiers to always be in the forefront, to always rise first to the attack. These were the Communists. They receive their party tickets in moments of silence on the front, surrender them for storage together with their orders, and go out on reconnaissance.... Or, we see the bullet-riddled party documents, stained by the blood, of fearless heroes who had given their lives for their motherland. The party of Leninist communists was truly a warring party.

There is impressive footage devoted to the labor of Soviet people who forged weapons for the front in the rear, and to the heroic partisan war in the enemy rear.

There is another image that the film documentary creates--that of the cruelty and inhumanity of fascism. The mass punishments and murders of peaceful citizens, the concentration camps and death factories, the razed cities and

villages, the scorched earth, and the annihilated monuments are all shown.

We also see, as the just conclusion and as a stiff warning to potential aggressors, the fascist leaders on the bench. The Nuremberg trials, the nations sitting in judgement.

The real culmination of the film epic is an interview with CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The wise party and government official, who was an active participant of the Great Patriotic War and is now an indefatigable champion of peace, says: "...the memories of this war are to us an appeal for alertness in relation to the designs of all new intrigues by aggressive forces, and most importantly they are an appeal for an untiring, consistent struggle for a secure peace, for cessation of the arms race, and for peaceful cooperation between states."

The remarkable film epic "The Great Patriotic" is a great achievement of Soviet filmmaking. It will serve as good material for military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people and soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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## SOVIET T-62 TANK DESCRIBED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 9, Sep 79 pp 484-485

[Text] About 16 years after its introduction in the Soviet tank units, and more than two years after the beginning of mass production of the new type T-64/T-72, the military journals of the Warsaw Pact states for the first time published outaway views and technical details of the T-62. Below we present a revised translation, since this tank model still constitutes the bulk of the tank inventory of the Soviet troops in the outlying areas of the USSR (see Number 11/78, p 582). It should here be pointed out that even now the Soviet data are extremely vague. In the Near Eastern War of 1973, hundreds of T-62's were captured by the Israelis. Nevertheless, important data - such as caliber, armor thickness, and range - still remain unmentioned. The Soviet Press is currently complaining loudly about Western reports on the growing threat of the Soviet Army. If its offensive potential is really being misunderstood, the nearly pathological Soviet mania for secrecy has itself contributed to this circumstance. By comparison, the battle tank Leopard 2 will first be delivered at the end of 1979, but not only has significantly more technical detail been published, but even the number of units ordered. No wonder, under these conditions, that the Vienna MBFR (expansion unknown) negotiations are also marking time because of unresolved discussions concerning data. - The Editors

"After the T-54 and T-55, the T-62 battle tank is another advance in Soviet tank construction. It is a modern caterpillar battle vehicle, with strong weaponry, reliable armor, and high mobility. It should be noted that the new tank was developed from the subassemblies of its predecessor, the T-55, and on the basis of this preceding technology. This considerably simplifies its production, as well as the training of its crew, and its operation and repair in troop service.

As the drawings show, the T-62 retains the proven arrangement of subassemblies and systems that were already used with the T-34. The driver space is in the front part of the hull; the combat space is in the center. The engine and transmission are collected together in the propulsion space at the rear of the tank. With this arrangement, the driving gears

(driving wheels) are at the rear, and are better protected against damage in combat. Furthermore, the engine and transmission can be made more compact, because they are joined together. This is very important for reducing the size and weight of the tank.

The tank is equipped with an on-board cannon and with a coaxial machine gun, 7.62 mm caliber. It protects the crew against the effects of pressure waves from nuclear explosions. It is equipped for underwater operation, and it also has night vision and targeting devices. The crew consists of four men: commander, driver/mechanic, aiming gunner, and loading gunner. The driver has his station in the driver space; the remaining crew have their stations in the combat space (turret). The driver space contains not only the driver's seat but all the necessary levers and pedals for steering as well as control and measurement instrumentation. The latter include a course indicator for adhering to the commanded direction under difficult orientation conditions, e.g. when running under water. The driver's seat is movable up and down as well as forwards and backwards. When running with an open hatch, the driver's seat can be set high enough so that the driver has a clear view of the terrain. Under combat conditions, the seat is lowered and the hatch is closed. The driver then makes his observations only through periscopes. An intercom system connects him with the commander and with the remaining members of the crew.

The combat space at the turret contains the weapons, the ammunition, and seats for the commander, the aiming gunner, and the loading gunner. The on-board cannon and the coaxial machine gun are stabilized horizontally and vertically, i.e. while the tank is running, they are automatically kept in their prescribed position, independent of the fluctuations of the hull. This guarantees effective firing while the tank is moving. For nighttime firing, infrared night vision and targeting units have been provided. The tank commander has available observation units in the rotatable commander dome. His targeting means provide him the opportunity, when necessary, of pivoting the turret independent of the aiming gunner, i.e. the commander can override the gunner and can aim the cannon in the horizontal.

The aiming gunner aims the cannon and the coaxial machine gun either by means of the control box of the weapon stabilization system or by means of the handle of the elevation alignment unit and the manual drive of the turret pivoting unit. The empty shells are ejected from the combat space, by means of a special device, through the ejection hatch in the rear part of the turret.


The V-55 engine propels the tank with a power of 426 kW (580 hp) at 2000 rpm. This is a 12-cylinder, high-speed, four-cycle injection diesel engine with liquid cooling. Engines of this type are already familiar and well proven with the T-34. Since that time, their parameters have




been significantly improved. In particular, their power, reliability, and lifetime have been increased. A unit for preheating the nozzles has been built in for better engine starting in winter. The engine is started by means of a compressed air starter system. The compressed air bottles are charged by a compressor, which is driven through a control gear. An automatic pressure unit maintains the required pressure in the air system. A supplementary electric starter is also available for starting the engine.

The transmission of the tank changes the torque and transmits it to the driving gears. It also drives the blower and the compressor. The transmission comprises the intermediate gears, the main couplings, the control gears, the planetary steering gears, and the lateral back-gears. In terms of construction, these units do not differ basically from those of the T-55.

Because the fuel tanks have a larger capacity, the tank has an adequate range. The chains are more reliable and more durable, because they have rubber-metal links. The tank is equipped with an automatic fire extinguishing system, which guarantees effective fire fighting. An auxiliary system makes it possible to camouflage the tank by a smoke screen, if needed." (r/c)





The T-62 Battle Tank

Key:

1. Hydraulic coupling amplifier; 2. Batteries; 3. Driver dashboard;
4. Target searchlight; 5. Elevation alignment unit for the on-board cannon; 6. Anti-aircraft machine gun; 7. Night vision unit;
8. Middle fuel tank; 9. Injection device for smoke screen system;
10. Engine; 11. Oil cooler; 12. Engine cooler; 13. Blower;
14. Planetary steering gears; 15. Control gears; 16. Torsion rods;
17. Combat space ventilation; 18. Nozzle preheating unit; 19. Seat for the aiming gunner; 20. Driver's seat; 21. Transmission shift lever;
22. Left steering brake lever; 23. Clutch pedal; 24. Forward fuel tank;
25. Turret pivoting unit; 26. Control box of the weapon stabilization system; 27. Cover of the commander hatch; 28. Searchlight; 29. Position light with digital display for night use; 30. On-board cannon;
31. Cover of the hatch for the loading gunner; 32. Periscope for the loading gunner; 33. Munition box for the anti-aircraft machine gun;
34. Munition box for the coaxial machine gun; 35. Recovery beam;
36. Munition boxes for the machine gun; 37. Slip ring translator;
38. Compressed air bottle for the starting system

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**DATE FILMED**

**5 Nov 79**

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